Primary Childrens Hospital/Sean Daugaard v. Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Primary Childrens Hospital/Sean Daugaard v.
Utah Department of Health, Division of Health
Care Financing : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton & McConkie; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jean P. Hendrickson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Primary Childrens Hospital v. Utah Department of Health, No. 981709 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1866
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S 
HOSPITAL/SEAN DAUGAARD, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Gviyncr 
Case No. 981709-CA 
Category No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Final Agency Order entered October 19,1998, by the Director of 
the Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of Health, which adopted 
the Recommended Decision of the administrative law judge to deny Medicaid 
payment to the provider. 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Jean P. Hendrickson #4986 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham #1231 
Attorney General 
P. O. Box 140835 
515 East 100 South, Eighth Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
Attorneys for Appellee 
PILED 
•irtof 
>',ATf 5 - 1999 
suiia D'Aiesandr© 
;terk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S 
HOSPITAL/SEAN DAUGAARD, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 981709-CA 
Category No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Final Agency Order entered October 19, 1998, by the Director of 
the Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of Health, which adopted 
the Recommended Decision of the administrative law judge to deny Medicaid 
payment to the provider. 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Jean P. Hendrickson #4986 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham #1231 
Attorney General 
P. O. Box 140835 
515 East 100 South, Eighth Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I. PRIOR AUTHORIZATION IS A PRECONDITION TO 
PAYMENT FOR TRANSPLANTATION SERVICES WITH 
WHICH THE HOSPITAL DID NOT COMPLY 9 
POINT II. THE REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION WAS 
NOT WAIVED 24 
POINT III. POST-TRANSPLANTATION AUTHORIZATION RULES 
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 25 
POINT IV. THE HOSPITAL DID NOT ESTABLISH EACH ELEMENT 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 27 
POINT V. EVEN IF THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL WERE 
ESTABLISHED, THE HOSPITAL DID NOT PROVE THE 
FACTS NECESSARY TO MEET THE UNUSUAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION 32 
CONCLUSION 36 
i 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 38 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A (Determinative Statutes and Rules) 
Addendum B (Final Agency Order and Recommended 
Decision) 
Addendum C (Amended Notice of Denial, Dated July 23, 
1998) 
Addendum D (Selected Portions of Record) 
l i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marsaw, 
13 F. Supp. 2d 696 (W.D. Term. 1998) 16,17,34,36 
Dodson v. Parham, All F. Supp. 97 (1977) 20 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) 10 
Laddv. Thomas, 962 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1997) 20 
McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 21 
Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1993) 22 
Pittman v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 
998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1993) 21 
STATE CASES 
Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) 32,33 
Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 25 
Brown & Root Industries Serv. v. Industrial Commission, 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) . 25 
Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) 2 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 33 
Magnant v. Ambulatory Renal Services, 575 N.E.2d 1029 (Ind. App.2 Dist. 1991) . . . 34 
Mercy Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare, 
492 A.2d 104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) 15,16,28 
In re Nemis, 351 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) 22 
O 'Rourke v. Utah State Tax Commission, 830 P. 2d 230 (Utah 1992) 35 
iii 
Orton v. Utah State Tax Commission, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 27,35 
Peterson v. Utah Department of Health, 969 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 2 
Pickett v. Utah Department of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 20 
Roberts v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 653 So. 2d 956 (Ala. 1995) 30,31 
Society of New York Hospital v. Mogensen, 
319 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) 22,34 
Soters Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) . . . 25 
South Davis Community Hospital v. Department of Health, 
869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 2,13,14,15,18,19 
State v. Inzarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997) 3 
Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 2 
Trolley Square Associates v. Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 3 
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) 18 
Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) 32 
Zissi v. State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) 2 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
42 C.F.R. 456.1 (1995) 3,12 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(5) (1992 & Supp. 1998) 10 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992 & Supp. 1998) 3 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(44)(A) (1992) 3,14 
STATE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1- 402 (1995 & Supp. 1998) 3,10 
iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1995) 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1995) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(2)(b) (1995) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(2)(a), (b) (1995) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (1995) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1997) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1997) 1 
Utah Admin. Code R410-14-2 (1996) 1 
Utah Admin. Code R414-2A-600(3) (1996) 3,11 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-2(14) (1996) 3,29 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-5 (1996) 3,12 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-7.H. (1996) 3,11 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-3(10) (1996) 3,25 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-5(5) (1996) 3,26 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7 (1996) 12 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7(1) (1996) 3,11,29 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S ; 
HOSPITAL/SEAN DAUGAARD. 
Petitioner and Appellant. ] 
vs. ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. ] 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, ; 
Respondent and Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 981709-CA 
) Category No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
In accordance with Rule R410-14-2, Utah Admin. Code (1996), a hearing 
requested by Petitioner Hospital was conducted as a formal hearing by the administrative 
law judge for the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. The 
provisions of Chapter 46b of Title 63, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, are applicable 
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1) (1997) "all final agency action[s] 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings" fall under the jurisdiction of either the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. In this instance, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1997), the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Division of Health Care Financing [DHCF/Division] correctly 
applied its rules governing prior authorization required for all transplantation services for 
which payment under the Medicaid program is sought. 
2. Whether the agency decision correctly concluded that the Hospital did not 
establish each element of equitable estoppel. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where an issue involves mixed questions of facts and law, the facts found by the 
agency are reviewable under a substantial evidence test based upon the record as a whole; 
the conclusions reached are reviewable for correctness. Zissi v. State Tax Comm 'n, 842 
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). An agency's application of the law to an historical set of 
facts may be reviewed by an appellate court applying "varying degrees of strictness, 
falling anywhere between a review for 'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' 
standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (citation 
omitted); see Peterson v. Utah Dep 7 of Health, 969 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); 
Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090, (Utah Ct. App. 1998); cf South 
Davis Community Hosp. v. Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (an 
agency expressly granted discretion by the Legislature has its decisions reviewed for 
reasonableness and rationality.). 
An appellate court considering whether equitable estoppel has been proven 
reviews this mixed question of fact and law under a correctness standard applying 
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differing degrees of deference. Estoppel is a fact-intensive question and the reviewing 
court will grant the decision maker a fair degree of deference. See State v. Inzarry, 945 
P.2d 676. 678 (Utah 1997); Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61. 65 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant provisions are included in Addendum A: 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(44)(A) (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 
456.1(1995); Utah Code Ann. §§26-18-1 to -402 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (selected 
sections); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997); Utah Admin. Code R414-2A-600(3) 
(1996); Utah Admin. Code R414-10-2(14) (1996); Utah Admin. Code R414-10-5 (1996); 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-7.H (1996); Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-3(10) (1996); 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-5(5) (1996); and Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7(1) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from the Division's denial of Medicaid payment to a provider 
hospital. Primary Children's Medical Center, for the Hospital's failure to comply with the 
agency's rule requiring prior authorization for all transplantation services to be paid under 
the Medicaid program. The only issue before the Administration Law Judge [ALJ] was 
the denial of payment for the Hospital's noncompliance with the rule. Matters 
concerning medical necessity were not before the ALJ and are not before this Court. 
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Through the assistance of the Hospital's resource counselor, the patient, Sean 
Daugaard. obtained Medicaid coverage in March 1997 in anticipation of the scheduled 
July 1997 bone marrow transplantation. Program access requirements of the Medicaid 
program require prior authorization for transplantations. When Sean was admitted to the 
Hospital July 8 in anticipation of the transplantation procedures, no prior authorization 
request and accompanying documentation had been received by the Division. Sean 
remained in the Hospital until his discharge date of September 19, 1997. On that day, the 
requesting physician signed the prior authorization request form. The prior authorization 
request form and supporting medical documentation were received at DHCF on October 
29, 1997. An amended Notice of Denial based upon the Hospital's noncompliance with 
program access requirements, specifically prior authorization, was mailed to the Hospital 
dated July 23, 1998. 
Assessing the evidence, the ALJ determined facts showing the Hospital did not 
submit a prior authorization request required by agency rule. Concerning application of 
the rule permitting post-transplantation authorization, the evidence presented by the 
Hospital did not satisfy the "unusual, emergency circumstances" criteria. The Hospital 
raised the issue of equitable estoppel against the Division at the administrative hearing; 
but, absent finding "unusual, emergency" circumstances as defined under the post-
transplantation authorization rule, this avenue of relief, too, was unavailable. 
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Finding that the testimonial evidence and the admitted exhibits did not show the 
Hospital had prevailed in its burden of proving the prior authorization had been satisfied 
or was inapplicable, the ALJ recommended that the Division's decision denying payment 
to the Hospital should be affirmed. The ALJ's Recommended Decision was adopted by 
the Division's Director as the Final Agency Order. Addendum B. The Hospital 
petitioned for review of that decision resulting from the formal administrative hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 8, 1997, Sean Daugaard, a child scheduled for bone marrow 
transplantation, was admitted to Primary Children's Medical Center. [Tr. at 19-20.] 
Earlier that year, the Hospital's resource counselor, Mr. Richard Bryan Fairbourn, 
assisted Sean's family in obtaining financial assistance for the costs of the 
transplantation. [Tr. at 20.] Mr. Fairbourn's employment duties entailed working with 
patients and their families to determine what financial or insurance resources existed. 
[Tr. at 35.] His testimony showed he knew there was no private insurance coverage for 
the transplantation. [Tr. at 68.] In Sean^s case, he assisted the family and Medicaid 
eligibility was established March 1, 1997. Mr. Fairbourn's testimony reflected that he 
was only aware of Medicaid coverage and that was his primary responsibility. [Tr. at 
68.] Records admitted at the hearing below and witness testimony established that 
Medicaid eligibility continued uneventfully until July. [Tr. at 21, 35; R. at 105, 107, 
110.] 
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Mr. Fairbourn reviewed the state's Medicaid status information system available to 
him at the Hospital on July 9, 1997, and observed no eligibility on Sean. [Tr. at 21.] 
This prompted him to go see Ms. Debbie Lucero, a state employee physically housed at 
the Hospital. Testimony from the administrative hearing of Mr. Fairbounf s account of 
that conversation with Ms. Lucero, as well as his testimony about his own thoughts and 
actions at the time, established that: (1) he knew Sean had Medicaid eligibility beginning 
in March; (2) he queried Ms. Lucero why; Sean had been covered up until then, but now 
the computer information showed no eligibility; (3) Ms. Lucero looked at the computer 
system and indicated it was time for review and that no medical card had been issued for 
July and a new application would be needed to re-establish eligibility; and (4) Mr. 
Fairbourn went directly to Sean's hospital room, met with Sean's mother who filled in 
and signed the new application which Mr. Fairbourn then gave to Ms. Lucero. [Tr. at 21-
22.] Mr. Fairbourn then entered a status notation of "pending Medicaid," referencing the 
application just delivered to Ms. Lucero. [Tr. at 27.] 
The next time Mr. Fairbourn took any action concerning Sean's status was August 
1, 1997; that was the date for his routine review of accounts. Sean's Medicaid eligibility 
was in effect for July and August. [Tr. at 23.] 
Mr. Fairbourn testified he was aware of prior authorization requirements imposed 
by other insurance funds; he would contact them to make sure the Hospital complied with 
the requirements. [Tr. at 38.] He placed his notations about patients' eligibility in the 
Hospital's computer system for others who may need to know. [Tr. at 40-41.] 
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At the August 1998 hearing, Ms. Bernadette McNally, one of the bone marrow 
transplant program managers and coordinators for the Hospital testified she had been 
with the Hospital in that position for one year. [Tr. at 71.] Her duties involved seeking 
prior authorization for bone marrow transplantation services for patients entering the 
hospital. [Tr. at 69.] She, however, did not have responsibility for Sean's case. [Tr. at 
73.] She testified that during the time she had been with the Hospital, she had submitted 
to Medicaid two prior authorization request forms for bone marrow transplantations. In 
each case the Medicaid eligibility was in place. [Tr. at 71.] 
The Division's exhibits reflecting the action on Sean's Medicaid status and critical 
dates with respect to the hospitalization and transplantation services were acknowledged 
and accepted as business records by the Hospital, [Tr. at 46, 66], and admitted by the 
Administrative Law Judge at the hearing. [Tr. at 66, 85.] These admitted business 
records showed dates of the Medicaid coverage beginning in March 1997, [R. at 105]; 
review and reauthorization for a medical card July 9, 1997, [R. at 107]; the dates of 
hospitalization and service for transplantation, which was July 17, 1997, [R. at 63; Tr. at 
82]; and the request for prior authorization from the Hospital dated September 19, 1997, 
[R. at 64], which was received by the Division October 29, 1997. [R. at 112.] 
Based upon the events transpiring in this case, the Division denied payment to the 
Hospital for its failure to comply with the prior authorization rule governing all 
transplantations. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Prior authorization is a precondition to payment for medical transplantation 
services. Participating providers operating pursuant to agreement with the Medicaid 
program are charged with knowledge of program rules. Nothing the state employee 
allegedly said or did waived the requirement imposed upon the Hospital that, as a 
participating provider in the Medicaid program, it was required to request prior 
authorization. Definitions of services and program access requirements are found in the 
Utah Administrative Code. Under the rules applicable to this case, bone marrow 
transplantations require prior authorization. 
The Hospital's obligation to comply with the program rules places upon it the 
responsibility to take the steps necessary to meet the program access requirements. The 
Hospital had the means to know of Sean's status, the scheduled dates of service for the 
transplantation, and the requirements of participation in the Medicaid program, including 
the specific requirement of prior authorization for all transplantations. 
The Hospital had the burden to prove it had either met the requirements for prior 
authorization or it was legally justified in not meeting those requirements. 
Agency rules distinguish between circumstances that are governed by the usual 
prior authorization requirements and those rare circumstances that justify application of 
rules governing "unusual, emergency circumstances." The rules contain definitions of 
"emergency transplantations" and "post-transplantation authorization" as well as program 
access requirements relevant to those rare events when prior authorization cannot be 
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accomplished. The events of the instant case do not fit the definitions permitting 
application of any rule other than the standard prior authorization rule as applied by the 
Division. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel generally is not assertable against the 
government for sound, valid reasons. Absent the exception of "unusual circumstances" 
being proved by its proponent the general rule governs. The Hospital had the burden of 
proving all the elements of estoppel. The record does not contain facts sufficient to meet 
this burden as neither a representation nor reasonable reliance on it were shown. In fact, 
the Hospital's witnesses professed a lack of specific responsibility for obtaining prior 
authorization for Sean's transplantation. Moreover, the Hospital did not prove the 
unusual circumstances necessary to meet the exception to the general rule disfavoring 
estoppel against the government. 
The Division reasonably interpreted and applied the applicable rule governing 
prior authorization of transplantation services. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PRIOR AUTHORIZATION IS A PRECONDITION TO 
PAYMENT FOR TRANSPLANTATION SERVICES 
WITH WHICH THE HOSPITAL DID NOT COMPLY. 
The single issue set for formal administrative hearing was the denial of Medicaid 
payment to the Hospital for its failure to comply with the Medicaid program's 
requirement of prior authorization. 
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To appreciate this requirement in the program's rules and the Division's 
application and enforcement of the rule in this instance, it is helpful to consider the 
interrelationship of the Division's rules, statutes and the requirements of the federal-state 
program known as the Medicaid program. 
The Medicaid program was established by Congress in 1965 when it enacted Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act. It is a cooperative federal-state program designed to help 
participating states provide medical services to certain needy individuals. Harris v. 
McRae. 448 U.S. 297, 301. 100 S.Ct. 2671. 2680 (1980). Through the federal financial 
participation, states share the costs of care with the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396 (1992). To receive federal financial participation, participating states must have an 
approved State Plan and a single state agency selected to administer the State Plan. See 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(5)(1992). 
Utah is a participating Medicaid state, adopting Utah's Medical Assistance Act in 
1981. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -402 (1995 & Supp. 1998). Utah has complete 
responsibility for administration of its Medicaid program and has designated the Division 
of Health Care Financing, within the Department of Health, as the single administrative 
agency for the state. As the designated agency, the Division is responsible for 
administering the Medicaid program in accordance with federal and state laws. 
The Division has a grant of broad authority from the Legislature. The Division 
"shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the Medicaid 
Program." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1995). The Division is charged with the 
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responsibility for an effective, efficient and economical program. It shall '^safeguard 
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services." Utah Code Ann. § 26-
18-2.3(1) (1995). It shall "implement and utilize cost-containment methods, where 
possible, which may include, but are not limited to: (a) prepayment and postpayment 
review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary; [and] (b) 
preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-
2.3(2)(a),(b)(1995). 
To accomplish the legislative directives to implement, organize and maintain the 
Medicaid program for Utah, the Division enacted rules to carry out policy consistent with 
state law and the requirements of Title XIX and applicable federal regulations. Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (1995). Rules covering services of physicians and hospitals 
provided by agreements are found in the Utah Administrative Code. Therein, program 
access requirements and service coverage rules define the conditions for payment. 
Inpatient hospital services and physician services related to organ transplantations 
require prior authorization. Utah Admin. Code R414-2A-600(3); R414-10-7.H; R414-
10A-7(1) (1996). Prior authorization safeguards against unnecessary utilization of 
services and ensures the treatment and care proposed for the patient meets the level of 
care needed. At the time of the initial prior authorization request, the referring physician 
must submit, along with the completed prior authorization form, documentation of the 
medical condition, prognosis, treatment history and considered alternatives to 
transplantation, evaluations of the patient's condition and the family's situation and 
11 
ability to cope with the pressures, medical evidence to permit evaluation of possible 
contraindications, as well as current medical literature documenting the efficacy of the 
procedure. Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7 (1996). 
Failure to comply with the prior authorization requirement prevents a review by 
the Division charged with administering a cost-effective program required by federal 
regulations. Failure to have a utilization review plan in effect renders federal financial 
participation unavailable in a state's expenditures for hospital services. 42 C.F.R. § 
456.1 (1995). 
Prior authorization is just one of the preconditions to reimbursement contained in 
the agency's rules for providers. Provider manuals and bulletins describe specific 
program policy and program limitations and non-covered services. A general list of 
services excluded from coverage is found in the agency's rules. A sample of this listing 
reads as follows: 
(a) Services rendered during a period the recipient was ineligible for 
Medicaid; 
(b) Services medically unnecessary or unreasonable; 
(c) Services which fail to meet existing standards of professional practice, 
or which are currently professionally unacceptable; 
(d) Services requiring prior authorization, but for which such 
authorization was not received; 
(e) Services, elective in nature, based on patient request or individual 
preference rather than medical necessity. 
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-5 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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From the foregoing non-exhaustive list it is apparent "prior authorization'' is part 
of a comprehensive utilization control process required of states participating in the joint 
federal-state Medicaid program. 
Circumstances comparable to those in the present case were presented to this 
Court in South Davis Community Hosp. v. Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). In that case, the Division of Health Care Financing [DHCF] denied 
Medicaid payment for patient care provided by South Davis Community Hospital. At 
issue was the hospital's failure to comply with the preadmission physician certification 
requirement. In the court's analysis of the applicable Division rules and state and federal 
laws and regulations, it determined that the action taken by DHCF denying 
reimbursement was reasonable and fully consistent with the program's goals to ensure 
that payments to providers promote efficient economical and quality care. The court in 
South Davis recognized DHCF was required to establish and administer a program 
consistent with the federal requirements while ensuring methods and procedures 
implementing the program would "safeguard against unnecessary utilization of care and 
services by Medicaid providers and to assure that payments to those providers are 
consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care." South Davis Community 
/7asp.,869P.2dat982. 
The patient in South Davis had Medicaid coverage effective August 1, 1989; South 
Davis sought reimbursement for the care provided for the period August 1 to October 31, 
1989. That application for reimbursement was made December 27, 1989, 
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notwithstanding South Davis had not submitted the preadmission physician certification 
required under the applicable administrative rule. The court observed that "under the 
applicable DHCF rules, in order to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement the provider 
must first obtain physician certification." Id. at 982. It observed further that the rules 
were in place in response to federal regulations requiring implementation of procedures to 
guard against unnecessary utilization and to ensure the providers' services were 
consistent with a program emphasizing efficient, economical and quality care. Moreover, 
"[a]s a central part of this federal utilization review program. Congress has mandated that 
whenever a Medicaid patient is admitted to . . . a hospital a physician must certify that 
the services being provided to the patient are required because the patient needs such 
services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(44)(A) (1992)." Id. 
The court stated that South Davis' noncompliance with the preadmission 
certification and the recertification requirements could not be cured by submitting the 
necessary documentation after the fact and claiming that Romero "could have been 
certified [and therefore it met] the certification requirement." Id. at 983. The court found 
that the hospital's reasoning ignored "the fact that DHCF's rules demand 
precertification." Id. at 983 (citation omitted). The court further observed: 
If South Davis had obtained the necessary physician certification and 
recertification and provided the appropriate level of care, as it is currently 
doing, DHCF would have reimbursed South Davis, as it is now doing. To 
hold that the denial of reimbursement based on one's own inaction amounts 
to a forfeiture would emasculate DHCF's requirements, which we have 
heretofore determined are reasonable and rational. 
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Id. at 983-84. 
This explanation of events and the court's reasoning are applicable to the present 
case. It is undisputed the Hospital did not obtain prior authorization. Prior authorization 
is a reasonable method of utilization control. The Hospital's inaction in obtaining prior 
authorization should not be excused on the basis that prior authorization is a mere 
formality. 
Similarly, in Mercy Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare, 492 A.2d 104 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1985), the hospital sought reimbursement for acute care it provided to a 
patient eligible for medical assistance. The Department of Public Welfare [DPW] denied 
reimbursement for the extended period because the patient remained at the acute care 
hospital beyond her certified length of stay. The delay in transferring the patient to 
another facility was caused by an administrative delay in approving her transfer. A bed 
was available but the rehabilitation center would not accept the patient until DPW had 
approved the application for transfer to the rehabilitation center. DPW had relied upon 
its regulations to deny reimbursement. In finding for DPW, the court referenced the 
regulations DPW had relied upon and quoted the relevant provisions as follows: 
Except as noted below, Medical Assistance payments are not made to 
hospitals either for specific non-covered services and procedures or for 
prolonged hospitalization which is not medically justified. 
Non-covered services and procedures include: 
(q) Patients who no longer require in-patient care 
(r) Patients remaining in-house beyond the length of stay certified by the 
peer review or utilization review committee of the hospital or the P.S.R.O. 
or the Department's P.D.U.R. unit. 
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The above categories of services or procedures are non-compensable to the 
hospital and physician under Medical Assistance whether or not the 
attending physician or utilization review committee of the hospital or 
professional standards review organization determines the medical 
necessity for the patient's need for the services. 
Mercy Hospital, 492 A.2d at 106. 
The court in Mercy found reimbursement was dependent upon compliance with 
the regulations. Finding that the agency's interpretation of its own regulations was given 
controlling weight, and that the interpretation was not "plainly erroneous, inconsistent 
with the regulations, or inconsistent with the underlying federal scheme," Id. at 106 n.3 
(citation omitted), the Department's denial of reimbursement was affirmed. 
DHCF's requirement of compliance with reimbursement preconditions is not an 
aberration of the Utah agency's creation. Preconditions are the norm. In Baptist 
Memorial Hospital v. Marsaw, 13 F. Supp. 2d 696 (W.D. Tenn. 1998), the hospital 
[BMH] sought payment from Marsaw's Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
[ERJSA]-governed benefits plan. Marsaw was admitted to BMH through its emergency 
department. In addition to the acute problems occasioning the hospital admittance, 
Marsaw suffered from dementia. At admission BMH was informed of Medicare 
coverage and coverage provided to retired employees of the Ford Motor Company. The 
Ford policy only covered vision and dental. Claims were submitted to Medicare. Over 
two years after the initial emergency admission to BMH, the Medicare intermediary 
discovered Marsaw had another source of health insurance coverage which had primary 
16 
health coverage benefits, therefore Medicare denied coverage as required by federal law 
BMH was not told of the primary payer at this time Several months later the Medicare 
intermediary informed BMH of the primary payer's identity BMH immediately 
submitted claims to the Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International 
Health Benefits Fund Payment was denied on the grounds that emergency services were 
not certified within 48 hours of admission and the claim for coverage was not submitted 
within one year 
The court in BMH decided the Fund's Trust Agreement gave the trustees full 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for plan benefits and interpretation of the 
plan's terms Reading the provisions of the plan together, the court concluded the logical 
and unambiguous conditions precedent to payment required timely submission of claims 
as well as timely post-emergency certification Quoting from a Fund director's statement, 
the court explained 
The one-year rule aids in long-term planning by enabling the Fund to learn 
relatively quickly whether it has large liabilities that may warrant the 
establishment of reserves It also minimizes the extent to which the Fund 
must pay bad claims due to the inability to properly evaluate their validity 
because it enables the Fund to make inquiries, relatively 
contemporaneously with the services provided, into such matters as the 
consistency of the service provided with the diagnosis and the 
appropriateness of the particular service 
Baptist Memorial Hospital 13 F Supp 2d at 703-04 
Just as the Fund's trustees m BMH had full authority to determine benefits 
eligibility and interpret the provisions of the plan, so, too, does DHCF have discretion to 
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interpret the provisions governing provider reimbursement. South Davis Community 
Hosp., 869 P.2d at 982 n.2. While Utah's Medicaid program is not a benefits fund 
created by participating employers like the ERISA fund in BMH, there are some 
similarities to note. In fact in the Supreme Court's opinion in Utah County v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), the discussion of third-party 
payers providing sources of revenue to IHC included payments from Medicare and 
Medicaid along with private insurers. No distinctions were made among funding sources 
whether from patients, private insurance companies or government programs. Mat 274, 
278. 
The rationale for the provisions applied in BMH, quoted above, is equally 
applicable to the prior authorization requirement of the Medicaid program. To fulfill the 
mandate of establishing and maintaining an effective, efficient, economical and quality 
program, DHCF must be given the opportunity to review the plan of medical services 
proposed for a patient before the procedures are completed. Otherwise, no inappropriate, 
unnecessary or experimental services could be screened out. 
The Hospital argues that prior authorization "has never been applied by the 
Agency to withhold reimbursement for 'reasonable and necessary' services to an eligible 
recipient." [App. Br. at 13.] The Hospital also argues that "[bjecause the service is 
mandated by federal law, (citation omitted), the Agency has no discretion to deny 
payment for admittedly appropriate services. [App. Br. at 13.] However, this states too 
much. 
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First the administrative hearing did not address the issue of "reasonable and 
necessary" services. That assessment would have been part of the prior authorization 
review conducted by DHCF had it been provided the necessary documentation required 
by the prior authorization request. Second, no evidence was presented that the Agency 
has never withheld reimbursement for failure to obtain required prior authorization. It is 
apparent, however, from South Davis Community Hosp. that reimbursement has, in fact, 
been denied for failure to obtain preadmission certification required under the Medicaid 
program. Third, since there was no consideration at the administrative hearing of the 
medical services provided, there were no admissions by the Division as to 
appropriateness of the services rendered. Finally, if the Hospital's position is taken at 
face value that the Division has "no discretion" when services are predetermined by the 
Hospital to be "reasonable and necessary" and "appropriate," the Division could no 
longer require prior authorization. This result would mean utilization control measures 
could not be followed. 
In addition to the Hospital's claim that prior authorization has never been applied 
to the circumstances as characterized by the Hospital, another similar argument lodged is 
that the agency acted contrary to prior decisions. This claim, however, is not supported 
in the record. The testimony of Ms. McNally that she had submitted two prior 
authorization forms for two Medicaid covered patients [Tr. at 71] does not meet the 
burden required of a petitioner alleging the agency's action was contrary to prior agency 
decisions. 
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The Hospital cites to Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), in support of its contention that the Division in this case acted contrary to 
prior practice. In Pickett, the petitioner, a licensed pharmacist, had his license revoked 
for certain violations of dispensing regulations. However, in Pickett the petitioner cited 
to ten prior agency decisions in which equally or more egregious violations were alleged 
against pharmacists yet the agency's actions "consisted of license suspensions, probation 
or a combination of the two, but no license revocations." Id. at 192. In the Hospital's 
case, no evidence was presented at the hearing that the Division acted here contrary to 
prior agency decisions. 
The Hospital cites in vain to a number of cases in support of its position that 
"medically necessary" services are mandated by federal law and, thus, failure to obtain 
prior authorization is not a valid basis for denial of Medicaid reimbursement. A review 
of these cases shows this reliance is not well-founded. 
In Laddv. Thomas. 962 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1997), the court found prior 
authorization to be an acceptable means to control utilization by Medicaid recipients. But 
more importantly, the prior authorization had been requested', the plaintiffs were 
challenging the notice requirements when requests for prior authorization were modified, 
denied or granted. 
Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (1977), concerned Georgia's proposed 
restricted drug list for Medicaid reimbursement. A prior approval mechanism for drugs 
needed and prescribed but not on the list did not accommodate emergencies, weekends, 
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evenings and holidays. Both sides of the controversy recognized varying degrees of 
deficiencies of the proposed controlled formulary and prior approval system. Those 
deficiencies were apparent to the court, and therefore, the court found the drug list and 
prior approval system defective. 
Still this case does not present the circumstances which give this Court a basis to 
find against the Division's application of the prior authorization rule to the Hospital. In 
the instant matter, the Hospital was on notice that all transplantations required prior 
authorization and it had ample time beginning in March 1997 when the Hospital 
employee helped Sean obtain Medicaid eligibility to submit the prior authorization 
request. 
Prior authorization was not at issue in McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633 
(S.D. Fla. 1992). This case discussed the question of a state's authority to refuse 
Medicaid funding for certain transplants that it deemed experimental. Whether or not a 
procedure is experimental is a matter outside the scope of the question before this Court. 
In fact, whether a procedure is experimental or not should be the type of inquiry resolved 
during the prior authorization process which the Hospital wants to ignore in this case. 
Similarly, Pittman v. Florida Dep 7 of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 998 F.2d 
887 (11th Cir. 1993), concerns only the question of discretion by Medicaid-participating 
states to not cover transplants. Preconditions to reimbursement to providers were not 
discussed or decided. 
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Again, m Pereira \ Kozlouski, 996 F 2d 723 (4th Cir 1993), a Medicaid-quahfied 
recipient sought Medicaid coverage for an organ transplant which the Department of 
Medical Assistance Services for \ lrginia denied on the basis it had discretion to decide 
which, if any, organ transplants it would co\er 
Which transplantations are covered or non-covered Medicaid services is not the 
issue before this Court These cited cases go to the question of an otherwise eligible 
Medicaid recipient being refused a medical service, this question has not been submitted 
to this Court 
The Hospital's reliance on Society of New York Hospital v Mogemen 319 
N Y S 2 d 2 5 8 ( N Y Civ Ct 1971), is misplaced The Department of Social Services had 
given prior authorization for the services the hospital had provided to the patient 
Inasmuch as the department had authorized the care provided and the court was 
convinced the department was not foreclosed from receiving federal reimbursement, the 
court found the hospital was entitled to payment In the present case, the Hospital did not 
obtain prior authorization and does not stand in the same relation to the Division here as 
did the hospital m Society of New York Hospital 
In re Nemis, 351 A 2d 363 (N J Super Ct 1976), cited by the Hospital, is a 
different matter The nursing home in that case prevailed upon the appellate court, 
convincing the court it had substantially complied with the requirements to submit 
documentation for payment although it had exceeded the division's six-month filing 
limitation The majority opinion relates a series of contacts by the home and the division 
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as forms were requested and partial billing documentation was submitted in partial 
compliance. The division's six-month limitation for submitting payment claims was 
facially reasonable and the delays in filing could be shared by both the home and the 
division. Nevertheless, the majority found that to affirm the denial of payment placed 
procedural form above the purpose of the medical assistance program. 
The Hospital wants this Court to decide that affirming the Division's decision is 
placing procedural form over purpose. The prior authorization required for all 
transplantations is the preliminary step providers are required to take in submitting 
medical justification to the Division for review for Medicaid coverage for the planned 
transplantation. In South Davis the hospital's belated delivery of records did not satisfy 
this Court that DHCF was required to accept what the hospital argued was the equivalent 
of the certification requirement. In the instant case, the Hospital argued it began 
collecting a large volume of material concerning the patient's transplantation at the time 
of discharge on September 19, 1997, and submitted the material to the Division in 
October. [Tr. at 100.] By failing to submit the documentation and prior authorization 
request, the Division was prevented from performing its statutory oversight duties and 
from complying with the requirement that it administer an efficient, economical and 
quality medical assistance program through application of its utilization control measures. 
The cases helpful to this Court's determinations concern the preconditions 
providers must satisfy to comply with conditions of payment. From the Hospital's own 
witness's testimony it is evident the Hospital understands the importance of requirements 
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precedent to payment for services. The following exchange between the Division's 
representative cross-examining the Hospital's witness Mr. Fairbourn clarifies the extent 
of the Hospital's understanding. 
Q: Now, do you ever work with other insurances with patients who are trying to 
seek a service? Do you ever work with other insurance companies? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: Do they require - Are you aware if they require prior authorization for services 
to be paid? 
A: Some of them do, and some do not. 
Q: What about the ones that do? Are you ever involved with contacting them to 
see if you comply with their prior authorization requirements? 
A: On the ones we have contracted for, yes, we do contact them for that 
authorization. 
Q: How seriously do you take that responsibility? 
A: Very seriously. 
[Tr.at 38.] 
The Hospital offered no justification for abdicating its responsibility to get prior 
authorization for Sean Daugaard's bone marrow transplantation. The denial of Medicaid 
reimbursement, based on the Hospital's failure to comply with the pre-authorization 
requirement, should be affirmed. 
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 
WAS NOT WAIVED. 
The Hospital's position that the Division provided "misinformation" and thereby 
"prevented" [App. Br. at 14-15] the Hospital from complying with the requirement for 
prior authorization, is not supported in the record. The Hospital argues such 
misinformation preventing its compliance with the requirement for prior authorization 
proves the Division waived the requirement. [App. Br. at 14.] 
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The record before this Court does not support the Hospital's late assertion of 
waiver. "[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute 
waiver, there must be an existing right benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). The transcript provides nothing evidencing a 
voluntary, intentional relinquishment of the prior authorization requirement. Nor is there 
evidenced "such a course of conduct" that Ms. Lucero intended to waive a Division rule, 
even assuming she had the authority to do so. Most importantly, since the Hospital did 
not raise waiver as a defense at the hearing below, this Court should not consider it for 
the first time on appeal. Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm Jn, 947 P.2d 671, 
677 (Utah 1997); Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
III. POST-TRANSPLANTATION AUTHORIZATION RULES 
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Post-transplantation authorization for circumstances not fitting within the standard 
prior authorization rules is defined and governed by agency rules. Under Utah Admin. 
Code R414-10A-3(10) (1996), an ^emergency transplantation" is defined as "any 
transplantation which for reasons of medical necessity requires that a transplant be 
performed less than five days after determination of the need for the procedure." This 
rule also defines "transplantation." It is evident the Division intended to identify and 
distinguish two potential transplantation scenarios. 
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Through the efforts of the Hospital's resource counselor Mr. Fairbourn, Sean 
obtained Medicaid eligibility in March 1997, well in advance of the anticipated 
transplantation in July 1997. This case cannot be defined as an "emergency 
transplantation/' It follows that the program access requirements permitting post-
transplant authorization [see Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-5(5) (1996)] for 
transplantation services in "unusual, emergency circumstances" is similarly inapplicable. 
This was not an "emergency." It was usual for the Hospital to recognize insurance 
companies have prior authorization requirements. The Hospital complied with these 
requirements, taking them "very seriously." [Tr. at 38.] No reasonable explanation 
exists, nor was one ever given, for the Hospital's dichotomy in logic in ignoring the prior 
authorization requirements imposed by Medicaid. 
The Hospital argues that testimony elicited from one of the Hospital's Transplant 
Program Managers, Ms. Bernadette McNally, established that retroactive authorization 
should be granted in this case. However, her testimony did not establish the unusual 
emergency circumstances justifying post-transplantation authorization for the present 
case. She gave no facts explaining the circumstances leading up to the month of 
transplantation that would satisfy the agency's post-transplantation rules for "unusual, 
emergency" circumstances. 
The Hospital knew for over four months prior to the scheduled transplantation that 
it had helped the patient qualify for Medicaid and then the Hospital knowing all 
transplantations require prior authorization, did not follow through with the requirements 
26 
to obtain prior authorization. This is not the ''unusual emergency" circumstance 
contemplated by the rule. 
The Division's application in this instance of the standard rules governing prior 
authorization of transplantations was correct. 
IV. THE HOSPITAL DID NOT ESTABLISH EACH ELEMENT 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
Reviewing the essential elements which the Hospital must establish to invoke 
estoppel against the Division, it is apparent that the required elements have not been 
established. 
The elements necessary to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) 
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
repudiate such statement admission, act or failure to act. 
Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
The focus of the Hospital's contention is the events of July 9, 1997, when Mr. 
Fairbourn testified he looked at the computer system for Sean's eligibility and observed 
computer screens showing no eligibility. He explained the Hospital had access to read 
the state's Medicaid eligibility system and was surprised to see no eligibility, knowing 
that Medicaid eligibility had been established for the prior months. He also testified he 
went to see Ms. Lucero, and asked her "how it was that we had worked with this family 
to get Medicaid eligibility and here we come to this point in time when there is no 
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eligibility/' [Tr. at 21.] He then testified Ms. Lucero told him "[t]hat it was time for 
review/' and "we needed a new application to begin the process over again and then re-
establish eligibility." [Tr. at 21.] In response to the conversation Mr. Fairbourn testified 
he had with Ms. Lucero, he went to Sean's room at the hospital, had Mrs. Daugaard fill in 
and sign the Medicaid application, then took the completed form back to Ms. Lucero. [Tr. 
at 22.] 
His next affirmative act concerning Sean's case occurred on August 1, 1997, when 
he conducted his routine review of his accounts in which he matched his accounts with 
the information he could access in the state's Medicaid eligibility system. On that date he 
observed that Sean had Medicaid coverage for July and August. [Tr. at 23.] 
This recitation of events shows, first, the state employee did not say or do anything 
which rises to the level of conduct to establish the first element of proof contemplated by 
estoppel cases. Mr. Fairbourn testified Ms. Lucero told him it was time for a review; this 
is not the type of information which should cause the Hospital to neglect its obligation to 
comply with the prior authorization requirements imposed upon participating providers in 
the Medicaid program. As the court in Mercy Hospital observed in deciding against the 
hospital's contention that DWP should be estopped to deny reimbursement for a patient's 
medical care, "hospitals participating in the Medical Assistance Program are charged with 
knowledge of the applicable DPW regulations." Mercy Hospital, 492 A.2d at 106 n.2. 
The second necessary element, reasonable reliance, is also not established. Mr. 
Fairbourn testified that, after handing the newly signed application for review to Ms. 
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Lucero, he did nothing more but schedule a routine review notation for August 1, 1997, in 
spite of his statements that the computer screen information on July 9 generated "a great 
amount of excitement" [Tr. at 20], and because of the "large dollars . . . we [had] a great 
interest in making sure that there [was] eligibility." [Tr. at 29.] 
Since the question before this Court concerns the Hospital's failure to obtain the 
required prior authorization, the focus should be on the Hospital's conduct subsequent to 
the Medicaid eligibility obtained for Sean in March 1997. The Hospital worked with 
Sean's family to obtain Medicaid coverage in anticipation of the soon-to-be-scheduled 
bone marrow transplantation. Prior authorization is required for all transplantation 
services. Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7(1) (1996). The patient was admitted July 8 in 
anticipation of the bone marrow transplant. It is the provider who must obtain prior 
authorization from the Division before providing services which require prior 
authorization. Utah Admin. Code R414-10-2(14) (1996). If that requires that the provider 
make certain the preliminary steps are completed, then the routine August 1 follow-up 
date is not indicative of reasonable reliance based upon the preceding events. Facts the 
Hospital knew or had reason to know were: (1) Sean had Medicaid coverage beginning 
in March, (2) the medical service to be provided was a bone marrow transplantation, (3) 
all transplantation services to be covered by Medicaid require prior authorization, (4) 
Sean's hospital admission date was July 8, (5) the scheduled date the Hospital had set for 
the transplantation procedure was July 17. 
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Even given Mr. Fairbounf s description of the exchanges he had with Ms. Lucero 
on July 9, the effect of those exchanges in no way justified the Hospital's failure to obtain 
the required prior authorization prior to providing services. To invoke estoppel against 
the Division the Hospital had to establish that its conduct was justifiable because it 
reasonably relied upon the statements of Ms. Lucero. However, the Hospital's conduct 
cannot be deemed reasonable since it had knowledge of all the facts and events necessary 
for it to comply with the Medicaid program's requirements for reimbursement. 
Preconditions to health insurance coverage are the norm. Providers and insureds 
are required to comply with the requirements of each plan to which they look for 
reimbursement or coverage. In Roberts v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 653 So.2d 956 
(Ala. 1995), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that Roberts could not recover 
reimbursement from Blue Cross for a surgical procedure because she failed to obtain 
preadmission certification required under her contract of benefits. 
Roberts is interesting because of the facts surrounding the particular surgery for 
which Blue Cross denied payment. Under the insurance policy, Roberts had had two 
previous in-patient surgeries and the one occasioning the lawsuit were all recommended 
and performed by the same physician. The physician's office manager, Ms. Joiner, had 
called the insurance company for the two previous surgeries and arranged for the 
precertification. She also telephoned Blue Cross for precertification for the disputed 
surgery. 
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This time, however, when she called Blue Cross their computers were down. This 
meant Blue Cross could not know if the policy was in force for the particular patient nor 
could it issue the pre-admission certification number which would indicate completion of 
the certification process. Notwithstanding, allegedly the Blue Cross representative told 
Ms. Joiner to go ahead and admit the patient and she would call back about the pre-
admission certification number when the computer came back up. 
Ms. Joiner flagged the file indicating a return call was expected or that follow-up 
was required for the certification. However, no one from Blue Cross called back and Ms. 
Joiner did not pursue the precertification before Roberts was admitted for her surgery. 
No one disputed that pre-admission certification was not done. Roberts contended 
she relied on the representations of Ms. Joiner who told her she had "already taken care 
of it" and because Ms. Joiner "had always done it." Id. at 957. However, Roberts' own 
testimony established she knew pre-admission certification was required for payment and 
she knew she had not obtained a pre-admission certification number for the proposed 
surgery. The Roberts court concluded that the verdict upholding Blue Cross' denial of 
payment was proper because under the contract between the company and the insured, 
the insured was required to obtain pre-admission certification. 
Similarly, as a participating provider the Hospital was required to obtain prior 
authorization from the Division prior to Sean's bone marrow transplantation if it wanted 
reimbursement from Medicaid. By rule adopted by the Division, the participating 
provider has the affirmative duty to obtain prior authorization. 
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V. EVEN IF THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL WERE 
ESTABLISHED, THE HOSPITAL DID NOT PROVE THE 
FACTS NECESSARY TO MEET THE UNUSUAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION. 
The doctrine of estoppel generally is not assertable against the government for 
sound, valid reasons. The interests of the public must be safeguarded against "the 
vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, the possibility of 
collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then suing for the value of goods 
furnished or services rendered." Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 
(Utah 1982). The Court in Sutro & Co. considered, at great length, the policy behind the 
doctrine and the occasions where the reviewing courts found that the general rule should 
not control. Under "unusual circumstances," the exception to the general rule was 
invoked to avoid an obvious injustice. 
A decade later, the Supreme Court of Utah, deciding Anderson v. Public Service 
Comm 'n, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), again stated that absent the exception of unusual , 
circumstances, the general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against the government 
should apply. The Anderson Court stated "[tjhis exception applies, however, only if 'the 
facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, 
to invoke the exception.'" Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827 (quoting Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d at 
720.) 
Describing the limited application of estoppel against the government in Utah 
decisions, the Court in Anderson explained that the "few cases in which Utah courts have 
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permitted estoppel against the government have involved very specific written 
representations by authorized government entities." Id. at 827. 
Among the cases specifically referenced by the Anderson Court is Eldredge v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), a case upon which the 
Hospital particularly relies. The Anderson Court pointed out that representatives of the 
Retirement Board made affirmative assurances, orally and in writing, to Eldredge that he 
would receive credit towards his retirement benefit for over six years of prior county 
service. The Court noted the representations were explicit were in writing and were 
repeated. 
The Retirement Office representatives made specific written assurances to 
Eldredge of his monthly benefit amount and upon these representations Eldredge 
reasonably relied, making irrevocable life changes when he retired. The information 
needed to determine retirement benefits was wholly within the control of the Retirement 
Office and the information was complete and accurately reflected Eldredge's years of 
service. The Anderson Court noted the irrevocable nature of Eldredge's decision also 
weighed heavily in favor of applying the exception and invoking estoppel against the 
Retirement Office in his case. 
The matter before this Court, however, is not one which justifies application of the 
exception to the doctrine of estoppel against the government. The Division made no 
explicit, repeated, written representations to the Hospital about prior authorization. 
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In Baptist Memorial Hospital 13 F. Supp.2d 696, the hospital was denied payment 
from the patient's Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA]-governed 
insurance plan for medical services provided totaling $356,984.57. On appeal, the 
hospital's equitable estoppel claim also was denied. The court found that the case relied 
upon by BMH in support of its assertion that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be 
applied to the ERISA benefits plan was distinguishable because in that case 
"correspondence that served as the foundation for plaintiffs estoppel argument amounted 
to a written modification of the underlying contract for benefits. . . ." Id. at 704. This 
was critical because, as the BMH court pointed out, "the applicability of estoppel 
principles in ERISA cases is controversial because ERISA forbids the conferral of 
benefits other than in accordance with the written ERISA plan." Id (citation omitted). 
The BMH court found that without evidence of the benefit fund's representations it 
intended to modify the specific plan term at issue, there was no reason to apply the 
reasoning of an ERISA case in which estoppel was invoked against the ERISA plan. 
This reasoning applies to the case before this Court. Equitable estoppel as a 
general rule is not assertable against the government. In the few instances in Utah where 
the courts have permitted estoppel against the government, the decisions were based upon 
finding "very specific written representations." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827. Such 
representations are nonexistent in the present case. 
In its brief, the Hospital relies upon Society of New York Hospital v. Mogensen, 
319 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), mdMagnant v. Ambulatory Renal Services, 575 
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N.E.2d 1029 (Ind. App. 1991), to justify estoppel against the Division. However, the 
reliance is misplaced because in both cases the Department of Social Services and the 
Department of Public Welfare, respectively, had given prior authorization for the services 
which providers gave. The Hospital in the case before this Court wants to skip the 
threshold question of prior authorization, which was never contested in the New York 
and Indiana cases. 
In Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm >2, 864 P.2d 904, the court reiterated the 
elements of estoppel and the particular additional requirement of "manifest injustice" 
where a governmental entity is involved; however, the court held "that 'sound public 
policy precludes the assertion of estoppel against the Commission for an incorrect 
assessment made by its auditor based upon inadequate facts.'" Orton, 864 P.2d at 909 
(quoting O 'Rourke v. Utah State Tax Commission, 830 P.2d 230 (Utah 1992) (citations 
omitted). Inadequate information provided by the Ortons resulted in an inaccurate 
assessment by the auditor, which in turn caused the withdrawal of a tax assessment 
against the Ortons. It was not until later, and upon more complete information, that the 
tax liability of the Ortons was properly assessed and which the Ortons challenged. Nor 
did the court find manifest injustice if the Ortons had to pay the taxes assessed since the 
taxes were properly assessed and the Ortons were lawfully required to pay them. 
While Orton is not an exact comparison to the circumstances of the Hospital, the 
fact that the Medicaid eligibility status was due for review suggests more information was 
necessary. Also, the Hospital was in a position to know from March up to the anticipated 
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transplantation date in July that prior authorization was a precondition to covered services 
for transplantations. The Hospital was required to take the necessary steps to comply 
with the prior authorization precondition. While Mr. Fairbounf s testimony established 
that the Hospital was concerned with the coverage for the expensive procedure, it is not 
sufficient in itself to say that manifest injustice would result if estoppel is not asserted 
against the Division. As shown in the Baptist Memorial Hospital decision, $356,984.57 
in medical service costs was not sufficient to cause the court to apply estoppel against the 
benefit fund when the hospital failed to comply with the terms of the plan. 
CONCLUSION 
The Division is charged with the responsibility of establishing and administering 
the Medicaid program in Utah. In performing its duties, it must operate the program in an 
effective, efficient, economical manner. The legislature has explicitly granted the 
Division discretion in establishing and implementing program criteria. Under that grant 
of discretion, the Division has interpreted and applied its agency rules to the 
circumstances involving the Hospital, which are the subject of the appeal before this 
Court. It did so consistent with the Medical Assistance Act and consistent with the rules 
promulgated by the agency. 
The Hospital, as a Medicaid provider, is charged with knowledge of the program 
requirements and is bound to comply with the rules and regulations governing 
participation. Under the program rules for transplantations, providers must obtain prior 
authorization for transplantations. Only under "unusual, emergency circumstances" do 
36 
the program rules provide for post-transplantation authorization. 
The Hospital did not provide any set of circumstances satisfying the prior 
authorization requirements nor did it provide any reasonable explanation for its failure to 
request prior authorization. Neither did the Hospital provide any basis for application of 
the "emergency transplantation" rules limited to unusual, emergency circumstances. 
The Division never gave any misinformation to the Hospital which would 
reasonably cause the Hospital to believe prior authorization requirements would not be 
followed. Since the Medicaid program must be operated in an efficient, economical 
manner and use of accepted utilization control measures which are reasonable is a 
rational means to achieve the program's objectives, the Division's decision in this matter 
should be affirmed. 




Jean P. Hendrickson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Laboratories excluded from participation under this subchapter, see 42 USCA 
§ 263a. 
Maximum amount available to Saint Elizabeths Hospital from Federal sources, 
see 24 USCA § 170a. 
Medical care for military spouses and children, see 10 USCA § 1079. 
Modification of mortgage insurance of hospital receiving revenue from program 
under this subchapter, see 12 USCA § 1715z-7. 
National Health Services Corps Programs, see 42 USCA § 254d et seq. 
Notice by Secretary describing limited benefits for long-term care services, see 
42 USCA § 1395b-2. 
Office of Rural Health Policy; determination of effects of policies under this 
subchapter, see 42 USCA § 912. 
Payment for services m general— 
Health fcare costs incurred by military dependents, see 10 USCA § 1095. 
Health maintenance organizations, see 42 USCA §§ 1395mm, 1395w. 
Physicians' services, see 42 USCA §§ 1395w-l, 1395w-4. 
Reasonable charges, factors considered, see 42 USCA § 1395u. 
State imposed higher requirements as condition to purchase of services; like 
requirements as condition of payment, see 42 USCA § 1395z. 
Veterans' Administration, department of medicine and surgery, acceptance 
of payments, see 38 USCA § 4108. 
Payment for services to hospitals— 
Average reasonable cost per patient-day, see 42 USCA § 1395tt. 
Determination of reasonable costs, development of model systems, see 42 
USCA §§ 1320b-3, 1320b-4 
State hospital reimbursement control system, see 42 USCA § 1395ww 
Payments under National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see 42 USCA 
§ 300aa-15 
Peer review; general provisions, see 42 USCA § 1301 et seq. 
Period within which State must file claim for expenditures under program, see 
42 USCA § 1320b-2. 
Pooling of funds for transportation services with State or area agencies on aging, 
see 42 USCA § 3026. 
Program under this subchapter not health-plan contract for purposes of recovery 
of costs of certain veterans' care services, see 38 USCA § 629. 
State plan for child and spousal support; determination of paternity of child 
born out of wedlock, support from parents for child in foster care, see 42 
USCA § 654. 
State plan requirements— 
Federal-State pilot program to provide medical and social services for 
certain handicapped individuals, see 42 USCA § 1382i. 
Income and eligibility verification system, see 42 USCA § 1320b-7 
Waiver, disallowance of items, see 42 USCA §§ 1315, 1316. 
State planning councils for persons with developmental disabilities; representa-
tive of State agency administering program included, see 42 USCA § 6024 
Student loans with respect to services in certain health care facilities in under-
served areas, requirements with respect to facilities, see 42 USCA § 297n. 
Utilization and quality control peer review organization, see 42 USCA § 1320c et 
seq. 
§ 1396. Appropriations 
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable 
under the conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance 
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or 
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilita-
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tion and other services to help such families and individuals attain 
or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is hereby 
authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient 
to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made 
available under this section shall be used for making payments to 
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, 
State plans for medical assistance. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, Pub.L. 
89-97, TMe I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343, and amended Dec. 31, 1973, Pub.L. 
93-233, § 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, Pub.L. 98-369, Div. B, Title 
VI, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Effective Dates 
1965 Act. Senate Report No. 404 and 1984 Act. Amendment by Pub.L. 
Conference Report No. 682, see 1965 98-369 effective July 18, 1984, but not to 
U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 1943. b e construed as changing or affecting 
any right, liability, status or interpreta-
1973 Act. House Report No. 93-627, tion which existed (under the provisions 
see 1973 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, of law involved) before that date, see 
p. 3177. section 2664(b) of Pub.L. 98-369, set out 
l f l (M . , u t> • KT no ^ i a s a n o t e under section 401 of this title. 
1984 Act. House Report No. 98-432 ^g%mmmk m . , . _ , _ 
Part II and House Conference Report ™\\ A * ' . Amendment by Pub.L. 
No. 98-861, see 1984 U.S.Code Cong, and 9 3"2 t 3 3 effective with respect to pay-
. , KT , Q - & ments under section 1396b of this title 
m. ews, p. . £Qr c a j e n c j a r quarters commencing after 
. , Dec. 31, 1973, see 13(d) of Pub.L. 93-233, l o ^ ^ f A • r> u T oo v n s e t o u t a s a n o t e under section 1396a of 1984 Amendment. Pub.L. 98-369 ^.
 t-tj 
struck out "of Health and Human Servic-
es" following "Secretary". See Change Change of Name 
of Name note set out under this section. "Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices" was substituted for "Secretary of 
1973 Amendment. Pub.L. 93-233 sub- Health, Education, and Welfare" in text 
stituted in item (1) "disabled individuals" pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub.L. 
for "permanently and totally disabled in- 96-88 which is classified to section 
dividuals". 3508(b) of Title 20, Education. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law 
Federal financial participation, see 45 C.F.R. § 304.10 et seq. 
Medicare and Medicaid, see West's Federal Practice Manual § 5811 et seq. 
State fiscal administration, see 42 C.F.R. § 433.1 et seq. 
American Digest System 
Appropriations and disbursement of federal funds, see United States <s=»82 et seq. 
Medical assistance programs, see Social Security and Public Welfare <s=3241 et 
seq. 
Encyclopedias 
Appropriations and disbursement of federal funds, see C.J.S. United States § 122 
et seq. 
Medical assistance programs, see C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 126 
et seq. 
Law Reviews 
Barriers to hospital diversification: The regulatory environment. Reed Hamil-
ton, 24 Duquesne L.Rev. 425 (1985). 
Behind closed doors: The confidentiality of psychotherapeutic records in 
medicaid fraud investigations. 6 Pace L.Rev. 441 (1986). 
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Note 3 
3. Eligibility even though she was not eligible pursu-
Although persons eligible for Aid to ant to state regulation. Cruz v. Commis-
Families with Dependent Children are sioner of Public Welfare, 1985, 478 
automatically eligible for medicaid, per- N.E.2d 1262, 395 Mass. 107. 
sons who do not qualify for welfare as-
sistance may nevertheless still qualify In order for person to qualify for 
for medicaid. Perez v. Lavine, D.C.N.Y. medicaid, that person must be eligible, 
1976, 412 F.Supp. 1340, supplemented and to be eligible a person must qualify 
422 F.Supp. 1259. under a state plan which agrees with all 
If alien was permanently residing in the statutes and regulations promulgated 
United States under color of law within under this chapter. Flathead Health 
meaning of federal regulation, she was Center v. Flathead County, 1979, 598 
eligible to receive Medicaid benefits, P*2d 1111, 183 Mont. 211. 
§ 1 3 9 6 a . State plans for medical assistance 
(a) Contents 
A State plan for medical assistance must— 
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivi-
sions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory 
upon them; 
(2) provide for financial participation by the State equal to 
not less than 40 per centum of the non-Federal share of the 
expenditures under the plan with respect to which payments 
under section 1396b of this title are authorized by this subchap-
ter; and, effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial partic-
ipation by the State equal to all of such non-Federal share or 
provide for distribution of funds from Federal or State sources, 
for carrying out the State plan, on an equalization or other 
basis which will assure that the lack of adequate funds from 
local sources will not result in lowering the amount, duration, 
scope, or quality of care and services available under the plan; 
(3) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing 
before the State agency to any individual whose claim for 
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon 
with reasonable promptness; 
(4) provide (A) such methods of administration (including 
methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of 
personnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Secretary 
shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure 
of office, and compensation of any individual employed in 
accordance with such methods, and including provision for 
utilization of professional medical personnel in the administra-
tion and, where administered locally, supervision of adminis-
tration of the plan) as are found by the Secretary to be neces-
sary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan, (B) for 
the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff, with 
particular emphasis on the full-time or part-time employment 
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of recipients and other persons of low income, as community 
service aides, in the administration of the plan and for the use 
of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in a social service 
volunteer program in providing services to applicants and re-
cipients and in assisting any advisory committees established 
by the State agency, and (C) that each State or local officer or 
employee who is responsible for the expenditure of substantial 
amounts of funds under the State plan, each individual who 
formerly was such an officer or employee, and each partner of 
such an officer or employee shall be prohibited from commit-
ting any act, in relation to any activity under the plan, the 
commission of which, in connection with any activity concern-
ing the United States Government, by an officer or employee of 
the United States Government, an individual who was such an 
officer or employee, or a partner of such an officer or employ-
ee is prohibited by section 207 or 208 of Title 18; 
(5) either provide for the establishment or designation of a 
single State agency to administer or to supervise the adminis-
tration of the plan; or provide for the establishment or designa-
tion of a single State agency to administer or to supervise the 
administration of the plan, except that the determination of 
eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be made 
by the State or local agency administering the State plan ap-
proved under subchapter I or XVI of this chapter (insofar as it 
relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the 
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter, or by the agency or agencies administering the supple-
mental security income program established under subchapter 
XVI or the State plan approved under part A of subchapter IV 
of this chapter if the State is not eligible to participate in the 
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter; 
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in 
such form and containing such information, as the Secretary 
may from time to time require, and comply with such provi-
sions as the Secretary may from time to time find necessary to 
assure the correctness and verification of such reports; 
(7) provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of 
information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes 
directly connected with the administration of the plan; 
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application 
for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to 
do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals; 
(9) provide— 
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than April 1 after the end of each fiscal year, beginning 
with fiscal year 1990) the following information relating to 
early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment 
services provided under the plan during each fiscal yean 
(i) the number of children provided child health 
screening services, 
(ii) the number of children referred for corrective 
treatment (the need for which is disclosed by such 
child health screening services), 
(III) the number of children receiving dental servic-
es, and 
(iv) the State's results in attaining the participation 
goals set for the State under section 1396d(r) of this 
title; 
(44) in each case for which payment for inpatient hospital 
services, services in an intermediate care facility for the mental-
ly retarded, or inpatient mental hospital services is made under 
the State plan— 
(A) a physician (or, in the case of skilled nursing facility 
services or intermediate care facility services, a physician, 
or a nurse practitioner or clinical nurse specialist who is 
not an employee of the facility but is working in collabora-
tion with a physician) certifies at the time of admission, or, 
if later, the time the individual applies for medical assist-
ance under the State plan (and a physician, a physician 
assistant under the supervision of a physician, or, in the 
case of skilled nursing facility services or intermediate care 
facility services, a physician, or a nurse practitioner or 
clinical nurse specialist who is not an employee of the 
facility but is working in collaboration with a physician, 
recertifies, where such services are furnished over a period 
of time, in such cases, at least as often as required under 
section 1396b(g)(6) of this title (or, in the case of services 
that are services provided in an intermediate care facility 
for the mentally retarded, every year), and accompanied by 
such supporting material, appropriate to the case involved, 
as may be provided in regulations of the Secretary), that 
such services are or were required to be given on an 
inpatient basis because the individual needs or needed such 
services, and 
(B) such services were furnished under a plan estab-
lished and periodically reviewed and evaluated by a physi-
cian, or, in the case of skilled nursing facility services or 
intermediate care facility services, a physician, or a nurse 
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456.481 Admission certification and plan of 
care. 
456.482 Medical, psychiatric, and social 
evaluations. 
Subpart H-Utilization Review Plans: FFP, 
Wdfvers, and Variances for Hospitals, 
Mental Hospitals, and Skilled Nursing 
Facilities 
456.500 Purpose. 
456.501 UR plans as a condition for FFP. 
UR PLAN: WAIVER OF REQUIREMENTS 
456.505 Applicability of waiver. 
456.506 Waiver options for Medicaid agency. 
456.507 Review and granting of waiver re-
quests. 
456.508 Withdrawal of waiver. 
UR PLAN: REMOTE FACILITY VARIANCES FROM 
TIME REQUIREMENTS 
456.520 Definitions. 
456.521 Conditions for granting variance re-
quests. 
456.522 Content of request for variance. 
456.523 Revised UR plan. 
456.524 Notification of Administrator's ac-
tion and duration of variance. 
456.525 Request for renewal of variance. 
Subpart I—Inspections of Care in Skilled 
Nursing and Intermediate Care Facili-
ties and Institutions for Mental Diseases 
456.600 Purpose. 
456.601 Definitions. 
456.602 Inspection team. 
456.603 Financial interests and employment 
of team members. 
456.604 Physician team member inspecting 
care of recipients. 
456.605 Number and location of teams. 
456.606 Frequency of inspections. 
456.607 Notification before inspection. 
456.608 Personal contact with and observa-
tion of recipients and review of records. 
456.609 Determinations by team. 
456.610 Basis for determinations. 
456.611 Reports on inspections. 
456.612 Copies of reports. 
456.613 Action on reports. 
456.614 Inspections by utilization review 
committee. 
Subpart J—Penalty for Failure To Make a 
Satisfactory Showing of An Effective In-
stitutional Utilization Control Program 
456.650 Basis, purpose, and scope. 
456.651 Definitions. 
456.652 Requirements for an effective utili-
zation control program. 
456.653 Acceptable reasons for not meeting 
requirements far annual on-site review. 
456.654 Requirements for content of 
showings and procedures for submittal. 
456.655 Validation of showings. 
456.656 Reductions in FFP. 
456.657 Computation of reductions in FFP. 
Subpart K-Oaig Use Review (OUR) Pro-
gram and Electronic Claims Manage-




456.703 Drug use review program. 
456.705 Prospective drug review. 
456.709 Retrospective drug use review. 
456.711 Educational program. 
456.712 Annual report. 
456.714 DUR/surveillance and utilization re-
view relationship. 
456.716 DUR Board. 
456.719 Funding for DUR program. 
456.722 Electronic claims management sys-
tem. 
456.725 Funding of ECM system. 
AUTHORITY: Sec. 1102 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1302), unless otherwise noted. 
SOURCE: 43 FR 45266, Sept. 29, 1978, unless 
otherwise noted. 
Subpart A—General Provisions 
§ 456.1 Basis and purpose of part. 
(a) This part prescribes requirements 
concerning control of the utilization of 
Medicaid services including— 
(1) A statewide program of control of 
the utilization of all Medicaid services; 
and 
(2) Specific requirements for the con-
trol of the utilization of Medicaid serv-
ices in institutions. 
(3) Specific requirements for an out-
patient drug use review program. 
(b) The requirements in this part are 
bassd on the following sections of the 
Act, Table 1 shows the relationship be-
tween these sections of the Act and the 
requirements in this part. 
(1) Methods and procedures to safe-
guard against unnecessary utilization of 
care and services. Section 1902(a)(30) re-
quires that the State plan provide 
methods and procedures to safeguard 
against unnecessary utilization of care 
and services. 
(2) Penalty for failure to have an effec-
tive program to control utilization of insti-
tutional services. Section 1903(g)(1) pro-
vides for a reduction in the amount of 
Federal Medicaid funds paid to a State 
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for long-stay inpatient services if the 
State does not make a showing satis-
factory to the Secretary that it has an 
effective program of control over utili-
zation of those services. This penalty 
provision applies to inpatient services 
in hospitals, mental hospitals, skilled 
nursing facilities (SNF's), and inter-
mediate care facilities (ICF's). Specific 
requirements are: 
(i) Under section 1903(g)(1)(A), a phy-
sician must certify at admission, and a 
physician (or physician assistant or 
nurse practitioner under the super-
vision of a physician) must periodically 
recertify, the individual's need for in-
patient care. 
(ii) Under section 1903(g)(1)(B), serv-
ices must be furnished under a plan es-
tablished and periodically evaluated by 
a physician. 
(iii) Under section 1903(g)(1)(C), the 
State must have in effect a continuous 
program of review of utilization of care 
and services under section 1902(a)(30) 
whereby each admission is reviewed or 
screened in accordance with criteria 
established by medical and other pro-
fessional personnel. 
(iv) Under section 1903(g)(1)(D), the 
State must have an effective program 
under sections 1902(a) (26) and (31) of re-
view of care in skilled nursing and in-
termediate care facilities and mental 
hospitals. This must include evaluation 
at least annually of the professional 
management of each case. 
(3) Medical review in skilled nursing fa-
cilities and mental hospitals. Section 
1902(a)(26)(A) requires that the plan 
provide for a program of medical re-
view that includes a medical evalua-
tion of each individual's need for care 
in a SNF or mental hospital, a plan of 
care, and, where applicable, a plan of 
rehabilitation. 
(4) Independent professional review in 
intermediate care facilities. Section 
1902(a)(31)(A) requires that the plan 
provide for a program of independent 
professional review that includes a 
medical evaluation of each individual's 
need for intermediate care and a writ-
ten plan of service. 
(5) Inspection of care and services in in-
stitutions. Sections 1902(a)(26) (B) and 
(C) and 1902(a)(31) (B) and (C) require 
that the plan provide for periodic in-
spections and reports, by a team of pro-
fessional persons, of the care being pro-
vided to each recipient in SNF's, insti-
tutions for mental diseases (IMD's), 
and ICF's participating in Medicaid. 
(6) Denial of FFP for failure to have 
specified utilization review procedures. 
Section 1903(i)(4) provides that FFP is 
not available in a State's expenditures 
for hospital, mental hospital, or SNF 
services unless the institution has in 
effect a utilization review plan that 
meets Medicare requirements. How-
ever, the Secretary may waive this re-
quirement if the Medicaid agency dem-
onstrates to his satisfaction that it has 
utilization review procedures superior 
in effectiveness to the Medicare proce-
dures. 
(7) State health agency guidance on 
quality and appropriateness of care and 
services. Section 1902(a)(33)(A) requires 
that the plan provide that the State 
health or other appropriate medical 
agency establish a plan for review, by 
professional health personnel, of the 
appropriateness and quality of Medic-
aid services to provide guidance to the 
Medicaid agency and the State licens-
ing agency in administering the Medic-
aid program. 
(8) Drug use review program. Section 
1927(g) of the Act provides that, for 
payment to be made under section 1903 
of the Act for covered outpatient 
drugs, the State must have in oper-
ation, by not later than January 1, 
1993, a drug use review (DUR) program. 
It also requires that each State pro-
vide, either directly or through a con-
tract with a private organization , for 
the establishment of a DUR Board. 
TABLE 1 
[This table relates the regulations in this part to the sections 
of the Act on which they are based.] 
Subpart A—General 
Subpart B—Utilization Control: All 
Medicaid Services. 
Subpart C—Utilization Control: Hos-
pitals 
Certification of need for care 
Ran of care 
Utilization review plan (including 
admission review). 
Subpart D—Utilization Control: Mental 
Hospitals 
Certification of need for care 
Medical evaluation and admission 
review. 
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TABLE 1—Continued 
(This table relates the regulations m this part to the sections 
of the Act on which they are based.] 
Admission and plan of care re-
quirements for individuals 
under 21. 
Utilization review plan 
Subpart E—Utilization Control: Skilled 
Nursing Facilities 
Certification of need for care 
Medical evaluation and admission 
review. 
Plan of care 
Utilization review plan 
Discharge plan 
Subpart F—Utilization Control: Inter-
mediate Care Facilities 
Certification of need for care 
Medical evaluation and admission 
review. 
Utilization review plan 
Subpart G—Inpatient Psychiatric 
Services for IndrviduaJs Under Age 
21: Admission and Plan of Care Re-
quirements. 
Subpart H—Utilization Review Plans: 
FFP, Waivers, and Variances for 
Hospitals, Mental Hospitals and 
Skilled Nursing Facilities. 
Subpart I—Inspections of Care in 
Skilled Nursing and Intermediate 
Care Facilities and Institutions for 
Mental Diseases. 
Subpart J—Penalty for Failure To 
Make a Satisfactory Showing of An 
Effective Institutional Utilization 
Control Program. 
Subpart K—Drug Use Review (DUR) 
Program and Electronic Claims 
























1905 (a)(16) and (h) 
1902(a)(30) 
1903(i)(4) 




1927(g) and (h) 
[43 FR 45266, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 46 
FR 48561, Oct. 1, 1981; 57 FR 49408, Nov. 2, 
1992] 
§ 456.2 State plan requirements. 
(a) A State plan must provide that 
the requirements of this part are met. 
(b) These requirements may be met 
by the agency by: 
(1) Assuming direct responsibility for 
assuring that the requirements of this 
part are met; or 
(2) Deeming of medical and utiliza-
tion review requirements if the agency 
contracts with a PRO to perform that 
review, which in the case of inpatient 
acute care review will also serve as the 
initial determination for PRO medical 
necessity and appropriateness review 
for patients who are dually entitled to 
benefits under Medicare and Medicaid, 
(c) In accordance with §431.15 of this 
subchapter, FFP will be available for 
expenses incurred in meeting the re-
quirements of this part. 
[46 FR 48566, Oct. 1,1981, as amended at 50 FR 
15327, Apr. 17, 1985; 51 FR 43198, Dec. 1, 1986] 
§45&3 Statewide surveillance and uti-
lization control program. 
The Medicaid agency must imple-
ment a statewide surveillance and uti-
lization control program that— 
(a) Safeguards against unnecessary 
or inappropriate use of Medicaid serv-
ices and against excess payments; 
(b) Assesses the quality of those serv-
ices; 
(c) Provides for the control of the 
utilization of all services provided 
under the plan in accordance with sub-
part B of this part; and 
(d) Provides for the control of the 
utilization of inpatient services in ac-
cordance with subparts C through I of 
this part. 
§456.4 Responsibility for monitoring 
the utilization control program. 
(a) The agency must— 
(1) Monitor the statewide utilization 
control program; 
(2) Take all necessary corrective ac-
tion to ensure the effectiveness of the 
program; 
(3) Establish methods and procedures 
to implement this section; 
(4) Keep copies of these methods and 
procedures on file; and 
(5) Give copies of these methods and 
procedures to all staff involved in car-
rying out the utilization control pro-
gram. 
§ 456.5 Evaluation criteria. 
The agency must establish and use 
written criteria for evaluating the ap-
propriateness and quality of Medicaid 
services. This section does not apply to 
services in hospitals, mental hospitals, 
and SNFs. For these facilities, see the 
following sections: §§456.122 and 456.132 
of subpart C; §456.232 of subpart D; and 
§456.332 of subpart E. 
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rules — Compliance with So-
cial Security Act 
Federal aid — Authority of ex-
ecutive director 
Medical vendor rates 
Enforcement of public assis-
tance statutes — Contract 
with Office of Recovery Ser-
vices 
Prohibited acts of state or local 
employees of Medicaid pro-
gram — Violation a misde-
meanor 
Utah Medical Assistance Pro-




Drug Utilization Review Board 
26-18-101 Definitions 
Section 
26-18-102 DUR Board — Creation and 
membership 
26-18-103 DUR Board — Responsibilities 
26-18-104 Confidentiality of records 
26-18-105 Drug prior approval program 
26-18-106 Advisory committees 











Department to award grants — 
Applications 
Content of applications 
Process and criteria for award-
ing grants 
26-18-305 Report on implementation 
PARTI 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
26-18-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L. use of confidential information in research 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted by 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws § 17 of the act For present provisions relating 
1981, ch 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to confidential information, see Chapter 25 of 
to 26-18-4 (L 1963, ch 38, §§ 1 to 4, 1969, ch this title 
197, §§ 64, 65, 1971, ch 53, § 1), relating to 
26-18-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the 
medical programs of the state. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the 
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1. 
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be 
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance 
for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant to Title 
XK of the federal Social Security Act. 
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or pay-
ments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance 
under state medical programs. 
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(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital 
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L. Social Security Act. cited in Subsection (4), is 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1. compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care 
Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and 
maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program 
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law. 
History: C. 1963, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L. repeal date of the Division of Health Care 
1988, ch. 21, § 2. Financing. 
Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-226 for the 
26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities. 
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of the 
department. The director of the division may employ other employees as 
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall: 
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this 
chapter; 
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and 
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in 
compliance with federal law and regulations. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 21, § 3. 
26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Peri-
odic assessment. 
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XEK of the Social Security 
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economi-
cal manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to 
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, 
excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that fail 
to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity or 
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to 
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with 
regard to both publicly and privately provided services. 
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods, 
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to: 
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utili-
zation is reasonable and necessary; 
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions; 
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(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropriate 
cases; 
(d) second surgical opinions; 
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services; 
(f) coordination of benefits; and 
(gj review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who 
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures and 
provisions of federal law and regulation. 
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effective-
ness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider 
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services 
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreason-
able utilization. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L. Social Security Act, cited in Subsection (1), is 
1988, ch. 21, § 4. compiled as 42 U S.C § 1396 et seq 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Discretion of division. 
Resource preservation 
ANALYSIS Resource preservation. 
Utah does not have a "resource spend down" 
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any state-
ment of policy expressing a desire to preserve 
Discretion of division. the resources of potential beneficiaries. Utah's 
The legislature has, by virtue of Subsection statutes seem to evince a legislative concern for 
(1), explicitly granted the Division of Health economy and efficiency in the Medicaid pro-
Care Financmg (DHCF) discretion to establish gram, not the preservation of applicants' assets, 
criteria concerning medical reimbursement Allen v Utah Dep't of Health, 829 P.2d 122 
When a hospital failed to submit a physician (Utah Ct App 1992), aff'd, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah 
certification before admission of a Medicaid- 1993) 
eligible patient and never obtained physician It is not unreasonable for the division to 
recertification at any time during the patient's apply a fixed asset limit forbiddmg persons to 
three-month stay m acute care, the DHCF adjust their assets to become eligible for Medi-
reasonably demed reimbursement to the hospi-
 c a id benefits Allen v Utah Dep't of Health, 850 
tal. South Davis Community Hosp v Depart- p2d 1267 (Utah 1993) 
ment of Health, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct App 
1994) 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment — Disciplinary measures and sanctions — 
Funds collected. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable ^ federal regulations. 
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent 
permitted by law and quality control services. 
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(4) The department shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and 
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and 
procedures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively 
may not extend beyond: 
(a) termination from the program; 
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and 
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social 
Security Act. 
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of 
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General 
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance 
with the requirements of that section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L. Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989, § 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42 
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9. U.S.C. § 1396r. 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ent. By these standards, a child's temporary 
absence from home will not qualify him or her 
_ ,
 r , for benefits independent of parental resources. 





P.2d 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Federal law. 
—Temporary absence from home. Medicaid is not intended to provide benefits 
Federal law requires that eligibility for "med- to the medically needy in circumstances where 
ically needy" Medicaid benefits be determined financial need is not fully demonstrated and 
consistently with the methods of the Aid to where benefits would be inconsistent with re-
Families with Dependent Children program quirements for the higher priority classification 
and the Supplemental Security Income Pro- of the categorically needy. Bleazard v. Utah 
gram. In the case of an unemancipated child, Dep't of Health Care Fin., 861 R2d 1048 (Utah 
resources include those available from a par- Ct. App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 81 C. J.S. Social Security and Public Key Numbers. — Social Security and Public 
Welfare § 126. Welfare «=» 241 et seq. 
26-18-3.1. Medicaid expansion. 
(1) The purpose of this section is to expand the coverage of the Medicaid 
program to persons who are in categories traditionally not served by that 
program. 
(2) Within appropriations from the Legislature, the department may amend 
the state plan for medical assistance to provide for eligibility for Medicaid: 
(a) on or after July 1, 1994, for children 12 to 17 years old who live in 
households below the federal poverty income guideline; and 
(b) on or after July 1, 1995, for persons who have incomes below the 
federal poverty income guideline and who are aged, blind, or disabled. 
(3) (a) Within appropriations from the Legislature, on or after July 1, 1996, 
the Medicaid program may provide for eligibility for persons who have 
incomes below the federal poverty income guideline. 
142 
63-46b-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
proaty, where there had been no proceeding on future review Archer v Board of State Lands & 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in Forestry, 907 P2d 1142 (Utah 1995). 
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a utnal-type hear- Standard of review. 
ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Profes- The reviewing court applies differing stan-
sional Licensing, 815 P2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. dards of review to an agency's legal mterpreta-
1991). tions: first, where the Legislature has explicitly 
This section requires that the district court's or implicitly delegated discretion to the agency 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings be to interpret or apply that law, an intermediate 
accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by deference standard of review is applied; second, 
reviewing an informal record, thus, the district where there is no explicit delegation of discre-
court erred m failing to conduct a trial de novo tion and the issues are questions of constitu-
of proceedings of the Department of Public
 t l 0 n a i j a w and s tatutorv construction, the court 
Safety relating to suspension of driving pnvi-
 reViews the agency's decision for correctness, 
leges. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449
 E l k s L ^ g N o s . 7 1 9 & 2021 v. Department of 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189 
District court does not have discretion to (Utah 1995) 
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by 
any method other than a trial de novo; this rule Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
guarantees the district court the opportunity to v Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
correct any deficiencies that may arise because 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
of the informal nature of administrative pro- State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. 
ceedings and provides an adequate record for App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by 
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
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(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demon-
strate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988. ch. 72, § 26. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
ANALYSIS 
Agency action. 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Exhaustion of remedies. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
— Interpretation of statute. 
— Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
Whether the industrial commission acted 
contrary to its own rule was governed by Sub-
section (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. In-
dustrial Commn, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
The tax commission's failure to detail how 
federal restraints on the use of subsidized prop-
erty should be assessed was not sufficient harm 
to the property owners to justify relief, when 
the only harm the owners alleged was that 
counties performing future assessments on 
subsidized housing would ignore the restraints. 
Alta Pac. Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Commn, 
931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997). 
Applicability of sect ion. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an agen-
cy's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Int'i, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Commn, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
The ground for relief provided by Subsection 
(4Kg) cannot be invoked to mount a facial 
challenge to an interpretive guideline used by 
an agency in its decision-making process. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. 
Commn, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993). 
Arbitrary action. 
Industrial commissions denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law. were reached, and there-
fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Conflicting evidence . 
In undertaking a review, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review. 
It is the province of the board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board 
of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appellate court refers to the assessment by 
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nical portion of clinical laboratory and radiology 
services, and medical social services. These services 
shall be furnished by the hospital. 
(2) Drugs and biologicals, approved by the federal 
Food and Drug Administration and appropriate for 
inpatient care, are covered Medicaid services based 
on individual need and a physician's written order. 
(3) Supplies, appliances, and equipment required 
for the care and treatment of a client during an 
inpatient stay are covered Medicaid services based 
on individual need and a physician's written order. 
(4) Inpatient hospital intensive physical rehabili-
tation services are covered Medicaid services, as 
specified in R414-2B. 
(5) Organ transplantation services are covered 
Medicaid services, as specified in R414-10A. 
(6) Inpatient hospital psychiatric services are cov-
ered Medicaid services only when the severity of a 
patient's illness and the intensity of service required 
are such that these services cannot be provided in an 
alternative setting. 
(7) Cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery is 
limited to: 
(a) correction of a congenital anomaly; 
(b) restoration of body form following an acciden-
tal injury; or 
(c) revision of severe disfiguring and extensive 
scars resulting from neoplastic surgery. 
(8) Inpatient hospital care for t reatment of alco-
holism or drug dependency is limited to medical 
t reatment of symptoms associated with drug or 
alcohol detoxification. 
(9) Abortion procedures are limited to those certi-
fied as medically necessary, approved by division 
consultants, and determined to meet the require-
ments of Section 26-18-4 and 42 CFR 441.203 (Oc-
tober 1, 1991, edition), which is incorporated by 
reference. 
(10) Sterilization and hysterectomy procedures 
are limited to those tha t meet the requirements of 
42 CFR 441, Subpart F (October 1, 1991, edition), 
which is incorporated by reference. 
R414-2A-500. Limitat ions. 
(1) Treatment of syndromes or disorders for which 
no specific therapies have been identified except for 
therapies that border on behavior modification or 
experimental or unproven practices, or for which 
medical necessity, appropriate utilization, and cost 
effectiveness cannot be assured, are not covered 
Medicaid services. The treatments are: 
(a) treatment of sleep apnea, or sleep studies, or 
both; 
(b) pain clinic services; 
(c) treatment of eating disorders. 
(2) Miscellaneous supplies, dressings, durable 
medical equipment, and drugs are not covered take-
home supplies. 
(3) Cosmetic, reconstructive, and plastic surgery 
procedures other than those specified in R414-2A-
400(7), including all related services, supplies, and 
any institutional costs, are not covered Medicaid 
services. 
(4) An inpatient admission for 24 hours or m 
solely for observation or diagnostic evaluation is 
a covered Medicaid service. 
(5) Nonphysician psychosocial counseling servi 
are not covered Medicaid services. 
(6) An off-unit pass is limited to an inpati 
rehabilitation or psychiatric admission pursuant 
a written order by the attending physician, pla 
by the physician or interdisciplinary team thro 
established goals and objectives, and adequa 
documented and evaluated in the progress notes 
the patient's chart as supporting the patient's p* 
of care. 
(7) A therapeutic leave of absence is limited 
inpatient rehabilitation admissions pursuant to 
written order by the attending physician, pi 
by the physician or interdisciplinary team 
established goals and objectives, and adequa 
documented and evaluated in the progress notes 
the patient's chart as supporting the patient's pf 
of care. 
R414-2A-600. Pr ior Authorization. 
(3) All services related to organ transplanta^ 
require prior authorization. 
(4) All inpatient psychiatric and rehabilita^ 
services require prior authorization. 
References: 26-1-5, 26-1-15, 26-18-3(2), 26-18-5(3), 
18-5(4), 26-18-6. 
History: 9757, AMD, 02/02/89; 11162, PRO, 11/1" 
13285, AMD, 10/08/92. 
R414-2B. Inpat ient Hospital Intensi 
Physical Rehabi l i tat ion Services . 
R414-2B-100. Authority and Purpose. 
R414-2B-200. Definitions. 
R414-2B-300. Program Access Requirements. 
R414-2B-500. Miscellaneous Restrictions. 
R414-2B-600. Prior Authorization. 
R414-2B-100. Authori ty and Purpose. 
(1) This rule defines the scope of inpatient hospi 
intensive physical rehabilitation services ava 
to Medicaid clients who meet the level of 
criteria for admission to a distinct part rehabili 
tion unit in an acute-care general hospital. 
(2) Inpatient hospital services are required un 
Section 1901 et seq. and Section 1905(a)(1) of f' 
Social Security Act, and by 42 CFR 440.10 (Oc ' 
1, 1991, edition). The requirement tha t inpa^ 
hospital physical rehabilitation services covered
 ? 
Utah Medicaid be provided in a distinct par t : ^ 
bilitation unit of an acute-care general hospi^ 
brings rehabilitation service under this author^ 
(3) This rule is authorized by Sections 26-1 
26-1-15, and 26-18-6, and by Subsections 26-18-3( 
and 26-18-5(3) and (4). 
R414-2B-200. Definit ions. 
(1) Terms used in this rule are defined in R414-1* 
and R414-2A-200. 
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program if, in the prior two years, the facility's 
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams has been terminated. 
B. Nurse aide training programs must be re-
viewed and reapproved at least every two years. 
C. The competency evaluation, both written and 
•kills components, may not be administered by a 
skilled nursing facility which participates in Medi-
care nor a nursing facility which participates in 
Medicaid. 
D. After January 1, 1990, nursing facilities may 
not use nurse aides for more than four months 
unless they have completed the nurse aide training 
and competency evaluation program. 
E. After January 1, 1990, a nursing facility may 
not permit an individual to work as a nurse aide for 
monetary compensation unless the facility has 
checked the credentials of the nurse aide through 
the nurse aide registry. 
F. Upon review of program performance stan-
dards, those programs not meeting minimum re-
quirements and which do not provide an acceptable 
plan for correcting deficiencies shall be terminated 
from the program. 
G. Retraining 
Nurse aides who have not performed paid services 
for a continuous period of 24 months since the most 
recent completion of a training and competency 
evaluation program shall be required to undergo 
necessary retraining. 
References: 26-1-4.1, 26-1-5, 26-18-3. 
History: 10188, NEW, 10/17/89; 16609, 5YR, 01/01/95. 
R414-7C. Alternat ive Remedie s for Nurs-
ing Facilities* 
R414-7C-1. Authority and Purpose. 
R414-7C-2. Civil Fines. 
R414-7C-1. Authority and Purpose. 
(1) The department conducts on-site inspections of 
nursing facilities to determine compliance with state 
and federal Medicaid standards. When the depart-
ment finds that a nursing facility is out of compli-
ance with requirements of participation, the depart-
ment may apply remedies to eliminate deficiencies 
and bring the facility into compliance. 
(2) Authority to apply the remedies described in 
this section is defined in the federal Omnibus Bud-
get Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987 (RL. 100-
203), which mandates compliance with require-
ments of participation for the Medicaid program, 
and in Section 26-18-3 of the Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Section 1919(h) of the Social Security Act 
specifies remedies available to a state when a skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) or nursing facility (NF) is out 
of compliance with the requirements for participa-
tion in the Medicaid program. This section requires 
the state to ensure prompt compliance, and it fur-
ther specifies that the available remedies are in 
addition to other remedies available under state or 
federal law and, except for fines, are imposed prior 
to the conduct of a hearing. 
(3) This rule establishes criteria for the imposition 
of remedies authorized by statute. 
(4) The department adopts and incorporates by 
reference the regulations in 42 CFR, Part 488-
Survey, Certification, and Enforcement Procedures, 
as amended in the Federal Register for November 
10,1994, 59 FR 56237. 
R414-7C-2. Civil Fines. 
(1) Interest shall be assessed on the unpaid bal-
ance of the fine, beginning on the due date. The 
interest rate charged shall be the average of the 
bond equivalent of the weekly 90-day U.S. treasury 
bill auction rates during the period for which inter-
est will be charged. 
(2) Disposition of Fines Collected. 
(a) The department shall deposit fines and corre-
sponding interest collected from Medicaid certified 
facilities in the General Fund in accordance with 
Section 26-18-3(5). 
(b) Fines collected by the department must be 
applied in accordance with Section 1919 of the act 
for the protection of the health and property of 
residents. 
References: 26-1-4.1, 26-1-5, 26-18-3. 
History: 12370, NEW, see CFR; 12370, CFR, 04/15/92; 
17069, EMR, 07/01/95; 17348, EMR, 10/27/95; 17349, 
AMD, 12/20/95. 
R414-10. P h y s i c i a n Services . 
R414-10-1. Introduction and Authority. 
R414-10-2. Definitions. 
R414-10-3. Client Eligibility Requirements. 
R414-10-4. Program Access Requirements. 
R414-10-5. Service Coverage. 
R414-10-1. Introduction and Authority. 
(1) The Physician Services Program provides a 
scope of physician services to meet the basic medical 
needs of eligible Medicaid recipients. It encompasses 
the art and science of caring for those who are ill 
through the practice of medicine or osteopathy de-
fined in Title 58, Chapter 12, UCA. 
(2) Physician services are a mandatory Medicaid, 
Title XEX, program authorized by Sections 1901 and 
1905(aXl) of the Social Security Act, 42 CFR 440.50, 
October 1994 edition, and Sections 26-1-5 and 26-
18-3, UCA. 
R414-10-2. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in R414-1-1, the 
following definitions apply to this rule: 
(1) "Childhood health evaluation and care* 
(CHEC) means the Utah-specific term for the feder-
ally mandated program of early and periodic screen-
ing, diagnosis, and treatment for children under the 
age of 21. 
(2) "Client" means an individual eligible to receive 
covered Medicaid services from an enrolled Medic-
aid provider. 
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(3) "Cognitive services* means non-invasive diag-
nostic, therapeutic, or preventive office visits, hospi-
tal visits, therapy, and related nonsurgical services. 
(4) "Covered Medicaid service" means service 
available to the eligible Medicaid client within the 
constraints of Medicaid policy and criteria for ap-
proval of service. 
(5) "Current Procedural Terminology" (CPT) 
means the manual published by the American Medi-
cal Association that provides a systematic listing 
and coding of procedures and services performed by 
physicians and simplifies the reporting of services, 
which is adopted and incorporated by reference. 
Some limitations are addressed in R414-26. 
(6) "Early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and 
treatment (EPSDT) means the federally mandated 
program for children under the age of 21. 
(7) "Family planning" means diagnosis, treat-
ment, medications, supplies, devices, and related 
counseling in family planning methods to prevent or 
delay pregnancy. 
1S> "Health Common Procedures Coding System" 
(HCPCS) means a system mandated by the Health 
Care Financing Administration to code procedures 
and services. This system utilizes the CPT Manual 
for physicians, and individually developed service 
codes and definitions for nonphysician providers. 
The coding system is used to provide consistency in 
determining payment for services provided by phy-
sicians and noninstitutional providers. 
(9) "Intensive, inpatient hospital rehabilitation 
service" means an intense rehabilitation program 
provided in an acute care general hospital through 
the services of a multidistipHnary, coordinated, 
team approach directed toward improving the abil-
ity of the patient to function. 
(10) "Package surgical procedures" means preop-
erative office visits and preparation, the operation, 
local infiltration, topical or regional anesthesia 
when used, and the normal, uncomplicated fol-
low-up care extending up to six weeks post-surgery. 
(11) "Patient" means an individual who is receiv-
ing covered professional services provided or di-
rected by a licensed practitioner of the healing arts 
enrolled as a Medicaid provider. 
(12) "Personal supervision" means the critical ob-
servation and guidance of medical services by a 
physician of a. nonpnyskaan's activities within tha t 
nonphysician's licensed scope of practice. 
(13) "Physician services," whether furnished in the 
office, the recipient's home, a hospital, a skilled 
nursing facility, or elsewhere, means services pro-
vided: 
(a) within the scope of practice of medicine or 
osteopathy, and 
(b) by or under the personal supervision of an 
individual licensed to practice medicine or osteopa-
thy. 
(14) "Prior authorization" means the required ap-
proval for provision of a service, that the provider 
must obtain from the Department before providing 
that service. 
(15) "Professional component" means that part of 
laboratory or radiology service that may be provided 
only by the physician pathologist or radiologist to 
complete the analysis of a procedure or service and 
provide a written report of findings. 
(16) "Provider* means an entity or a licensed 
practitioner of the healing arts providing approved 
Medicaid services to patients undisr a provider 
agreement with the Department 
(17) "Services" means the types of medical assis-
tance specified in Sections 1905(aXl) through (18) of 
the Social Security Act and interpreted in 42 CFR 
440, October 1994 edition, which are adopted and 
incorporated by reference. 
(18) Technical component" means that part of 
laboratory or radiology service necessary to secure a 
specimen and prepare it for analysis, or to take an 
x-ray and prepare it for reading and interpretation. 
R414-10-3. Client Eligibility Requirements. 
Physician services are available to categorically 
and medically needy eligible mdividuals. 
R4 J.4-10-4. Program Access Requirements. 
(1) Physician services are available only from a 
physician who meets all requirements necessary to 
participate in the Utah Medicaid Program and who 
has signed a provider agreement. 
(2) Physician services are available only from a 
physician who renders medically necessary physi-
cian services in accordance with his specific provider 
agreement and with Department rulea*. 
(3) An eligible Medicaid client may seek physician 
services from: 
(a) a physician in private practice who is an 
enrolled Medicaid provider, 
(b) a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 
that has a contract with the Department; 
(c) a federally qualified community health center; 
or 
(d) any other organized practice setting recognized 
by the Department for providing physician services. 
R4J4-10-5. Service Coverage, 
(J.) Physician services involve direct patient care 
and securing and supervising appropriate diagnostic 
ancillary tests or services in order to diagnose the 
existence, nature, or extent of illness, injury; or 
disability. In addition, physician services involve 
estsh&shi&g * COQTM of medically aece&aary treat-
ment designed to prevent or rninimize the adverse 
effects of human disease, pain, illness, injury, infir-
mity, deformity, or other impairments to a client's 
physical or mental health. 
(2) Physician services may be provided, only within 
the parameters of accepted medical practice and are 
subject to limitations and exclusions established by 
the Department on the basis of medical necessity, 
appropriateness, and utilization control consider-
ations. 
(3) Program limitations and noncovered services 
are established by specific program policy main-
tained in the Physician Provider Manual and up-
dated by notification through Medicaid Provider 
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Bulletins. Following is a general Est of medical and 
health care services excluded from coverage: 
(a) Services rendered during a period the recipient 
was ineligible for Medicaid; 
(b) Services medically unnecessary or unreason-
able; 
(c) Services which fail to meet existing standards 
of professional practice, or which are currently pro-
fessionally unacceptable; 
(d) Services requiring prior authorization, but far 
which such authorization was not received; 
(e) Services, elective in nature, based on patient 
request or individual preference rather than medical 
necessity; 
(f) Services fraudulently claimed; 
(g) Services which represent abuse or overuse; 
(h) Services rejected or disallowed by Medicare 
when the rejection was based upon any of the 
reasons listed above. 
(4) Experimental or medically unproven physician 
services or procedures are excluded from coverage. 
Criteria established and approved by the Depart-
ment staff and physician consultants are used to 
identify noncovered services and procedures. Policy 
statements developed by the Department of Health 
and Human Services, Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration, Coverage Issues Bureau, are also used 
to determine Department policy for noncovered ser-
vices. 
(5) Certain services are excluded from coverage 
because medical necessity, appropriate utilization, 
and cost effectiveness of the services cannot be 
assured. A variety of lifestyle factors contribute to 
the 'syndromes9 associated with such services, and 
there is no specific therapy or treatment identified 
except for those that border on behavior modifica-
tion, experimental, or unproven practices. Services 
include: 
(a) Sleep apnea or sleep studies, or both; 
(b) Pain clinics; and 
(c) Eating disorders clinics. 
(6) When a service or procedure does not qualify 
for coverage under the Medicaid program because it 
is an elective cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic 
surgery, all related services, supplies, and institu-
tional costs are excluded from coverage. 
(7) Medications for appetite suppression, surgical 
procedures, unproven or experimental treatments, 
or educational, nutritional support programs for the 
treatment of obesity or weight control, are excluded 
from coverage. 
(8) Cognitive or Office Services: 
(a) Cognitive services by a provider are limited to 
one service per client per day. These services are 
defined as office visits, hospital visits except for 
those following a package surgical procedure, 
therapy visits, and other types of nonsurgical ser-
vices. When a second office visit for the same prob-
lem or a hospital admission occurs on the same date 
as another service, the physician shall combine the 
services as one service and select a procedure code 
that indicates the overall care given. 
(b) Routine physical examinations, not part of an 
otherwise medically necessary service, are excluded 
from coverage, except in the following circum-
stances: 
(i) Preschool and school age children, including 
those who are EPSDT (CHEC) eligible, participating 
in the ongoing CHEC program of scheduled services 
and follow-up care. 
(ii) New patients seeing a physician for the first 
time with an initial complaint where a comprehen-
sive physical examination, including a medical and 
social history, is necessary. 
,,(iii) Medically necessary examinations associated 
with birth control medication, devices, and instruc-
tions. 
(c) Family planning services may be provided only 
by or under the supervision of a physician and only 
to individuals of childbearing age, including sexu-
ally active minors. The following services are ex-
cluded from coverage as family planning services: 
(i) Experimental or unproven medical procedures, 
practices, or medication. 
(ii) Surgical procedures for the reversal of previ-
ous elective sterilization, both male and female. 
(iii) Infertility studies. 
(iv) In-vitro fertilization. 
(v) Artificial insemination. 
(vi) Surrogate motherhood, including all services, 
tests, and related charges. 
(vii) Abortion, except where the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to 
term, or where pregnancy is the result of rape or 
incest. 
(d) After-hours service codes may be used only by 
a private physician, primary care provider, who 
responds to treat a patient in the physician's private 
office for a medical emergency, accident, or injury 
after regular office hours. Only one of the after hours 
CPT codes may be used per visit. 
(e) Only the laboratory tests in the following list 
are covered as part of a physician's office service. An 
independent laboratory shall provide all other labo-
ratory services. The independent laboratory com-
pleting the service must bill the Department directly 
to receive payment for the service. 
(i) 81000 Urinalysis by reagent strips, any number 
of components: with microscopy; 
(ii) 81002 Urinalysis without microscopy; 
(iii) 82270 Blood: occult, feces, screening; 
(iv) 82948 Glucose: blood, stick test; 
(v) 84702 Gonadotropin, chorionic: quantitative; 
(vi) 84703 Gonadotropin, chorionic: qualitative; 
(vii) 85007 Blood count: manual differential WBC 
(includes RBC morphology and platelet estimation); 
(via) 85014 Blood count: hematocrit; 
(ix) 85021 Blood count: hemogram, automated 
(RBC, WBC, HgB, Hct and indices only); 
(x) 85022 Blood count: hemogram, automated, and 
manual differential WBC count (CBC); 
(xi) 85023 Blood count: hemogram and platelet 
count, automated, and manual differential WBC 
count (CBC); 
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(rii) 85024 Blood count: hemogram and platelet 
count, automated, and automated partial differen-
tial WBC count (CBC); 
(xiii) 85025 Blood count: hemogram and platelet 
count, automated, and automated complete differen-
tial WBC count (CBC); 
(xiv) 85027 Blood count: hemogram and platelet 
count, automated; 
(xv) 85031 Blood count: hemogram, manual, com-
plete CBC (RBC, WBC, HgB, Hct, differential and 
indices); 
(xvi) 85048 Blood Count: white blood cell (WBC); 
(xvii) 85650 Sedimentation rate (ESR): Wintrobe 
type; 
(xviii) 85651 Sedimentation rate: Westergren 
type; 
(xix) 86300 Heterophile antibodies: screening (in-
cludes monotype test) slide or tube; 
(xz) 86317 Immunoassay for infectious agent an-
tigen or antibody, each; 
(xxi) 86403 Particle agglutination, rapid test for 
infectious agent, each antigen; 
(xrii) 86580 Skin test: tuberculosis, intradermal; 
(xariii) 86585 Skin test: tuberculosis, tine test; 
(xxiv) 87081 Culture, bacterial, screening only, for 
single organisms; 
(xxv) 87082 Culture, presumptive, pathogenic or-
ganisms, screening only, by commercial kit; for 
single organisms; 
(xxvi) 87210 Smear, primary source: wet mount 
with simple stain, for bacteria, fungi, ova, and 
parasites; 
(xxvii) 87220 Tissue examination for fungi (e.g., 
ElOH slide). 
(f) In addition to the above laboratory services, the 
following services are covered when a private phy-
sician personally collects the specimen: 
(i) 85095 Bone marrow smear or cell block or both: 
aspiration only; 
(ii) 85102 Bone marrow biopsy, needle or trocar. 
(g) A specimen collection fee is covered for service 
in a physician's office only when a specimen is to be 
sent to an outside laboratory, and the physician or 
one of his office staff under his personal supervision 
actually extracts the specimen from a patient, and 
only by one of the following procedures: 
(i) Drawing a blood sample through venipuncture, 
Le., inserting into a vein a needle with syringe or 
vacutainer to draw the specimen; or 
(ii) Collecting a urine sample by catheterization. 
(h) Eye examinations are covered, but only once 
each calendar year. 
(i) Contact lenses are covered only for aphakia, 
nystagmus, keratoconus, severe corneal distortion, 
cataract surgery, and in those cases where visual 
acuity cannot be corrected to at least 20/70 in the 
better eye. 
(9) Psychiatric Services: 
(a) Psychiatric services or psychosocial diagnosis 
and counseling are specialty medical services. Psy-
chiatric services, whether in a private office, a group 
practice, or private clinic setting, may only be pro-
vided directly and documented and billed to the 
Department by the private physician. Charting and 
documentation must clearly reflect the private phy-
sician's direct provision of care. 
(b) Nonphysician psychosocial coumseling services 
are excluded from coverage as a Medicaid benefit 
The personal supervision policy, R414-45-1, may not 
be applied to psychiatric services. 
(c) Admission to a general hospital for psychiatric 
care by a physician requires prior autliorization and 
is limited to those cases determined by established 
criteria and utilization review standards to be of a 
severity that appropriate intensity of service cannot 
be provided in any alternate setting. 
(10) Laboratory and Radiology Services: 
(a) Laboratory services identified by CPT codes 
80000 through 89999, and radiology services identi-
fied by CPT codes 70000 through 79999 are ancillary 
medical services with both a technical and profes-
sional component The professional component, e.g., 
analysis, interpretation and written report, repre-
sented by modifier 26, may be provided only by a 
pathologist or a radiologist practicing m an indepen-
dent or hospital laboratory or radiology setting. 
Private physicians who are not pathologists or radi-
ologists may not mil for the service described by 
modifier 26 for telling a patient the results of labo-
ratory or radiology procedures as noted on the 
laboratory or radiology printout or the written re-
port Providing such information to the patient is 
part of the office call rather than a separate service. 
(b) Physicians prepared in a highly specialized 
field of practice, e.g., neurology or neurosurgery, who 
provide consultation and diagnostic radiology ser-
vices in an independent setting at the request of a 
private physician may bill for both the technical and 
professional component of the radiology service. 
(11) Hospital Services: 
(a) A patient hospitalized for nonsurgical services 
may require more than one visit per clay because of 
the patient's condition and treatment; needs. Since 
physician visits are limited to one per day, the 
physician shall select one procedure code to define 
the overall care given. If intensive care services are 
provided, or critical care service codes are used to 
define service provided, the Department requires 
additional documentation from the physician. The 
medical record must show documentation of medical 
necessity and result of the additional service. 
(b) If, for the convenience of the physician and not 
for medical necessity, a patient is transferred be-
tween physicians within the same hospital or from 
one hospital to another hospital, both physicians 
may only use subsequent hospital care; service codes 
to define and bill for services provided. Under this 
policy limitation, services associated with the follow-
ing codes are excluded firom coverage as a Medicaid 
benefit: 
(i) Consultation; and 
(ii) Initial hospital care services. 
(c) Treatment of alcoholism or drug dependency in 
an inpatient setting is limited to acute care for 
detoxification only. 
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(12) Abortion, Sterilization and Hysterectomy: 
(a) Abortion procedures are limited only to those 
with medical certification of necessity as described 
in 42 CFR 441.203, October 1994 edition, which is 
adopted and incorporated by reference. 
(b) Sterilization and hysterectomy procedures are 
limited to those which meet the requirements of 42 
CFR 441, Subpart F, October 1994 edition, which is 
adopted and incorporated by reference. 
(13) Cosmetic, Plastic, or Reconstructive Services: 
(a) Cosmetic, plastic, or reconstructive surgery 
procedures may only be covered when medically 
necessary to: 
(i) correct a congenital anomaly, 
(ii) restore body form or function following an 
accidental injury; or 
(iii) revise severe disfiguring and extensive scar* 
ring resulting from neoplastic surgery. 
(14) Surgical Services: 
(a) Surgical procedures denned and coded in the 
CPT Manual are limited by Utah Medicaid policy to 
place of service, to prior authorization, or are ex-
cluded from coverage. Limitations are documented 
on the Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior Au-
thorization List, reviewed and revised yearly and 
maintained in the Physician Provider Manual 
through notification by Provider Bulletins. 
(b) Surgical procedures are "package" services. 
The package service includes: 
(i) the preoperative examination, initiation of the 
hospital record, and development of a treatment 
program either in the physician's office on the day 
before admission, or in the hospital or the physi-
cian's office on the same day as admission to the 
hospital; 
(ii) the operation; 
(iii) any topical, local, or regional anesthesia; and 
(iv) the normal, uncomplicated follow-up care cov-
ering the period of hospitalization and office fol-
low-up for progress checks or any service directly 
related to the surgical procedure for up to six weeks 
post surgery. 
(c) Interpretation of "package" services: 
(i) A physician may not bill for an office visit the 
day prior to surgery, for preadmission or admission 
workup, or for subsequent hospital care while the 
patient is being prepared, hospitalized, or under 
care for a "package" surgical service. 
(ii) Consultation services may be billed by the 
consulting physician only when consultation and no 
other service is provided. When a consulting physi-
cian admits and follows a patient, independently or 
concurrently with the primary physician, only ad-
mission codes and subsequent care codes may be 
used. 
(iii) Office visits for up to six weeks following the 
hospitalization which relate to the same diagnosis 
are part of the "package" service. The only exception 
to either inpatient or office service is for service 
related to complications, exacerbations, or recur-
rence of other diseases or problems requiring addi-
tional or separate service. 
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(d) Procedures exempt from the "package* defini-
tion are identified in the CPT Manual by an aster-
isk. The CPT Manual outlines the surgical guide-
lines which apply to documentation and billing of 
procedures marked by an asterisk. 
(e) Complications, exacerbations, recurrence, or 
the presence of other diseases or injuries requiring 
services concurrent with the initial surgical proce-
dure during the listed period of normal follow-up 
-care, may warrant additional charges only when the 
record shows extensive documentation and justifica-
tion of additional services. 
(f) When an additional surgical procedure is car-
ried out within the listed period of follow-up care for 
a previous surgery, the follow-up periods continue 
concurrently to their normal terminations. 
(g) Preoperative examination and planning are 
covered as separate services only in the following 
circumstances: 
(i) When the preoperative visit is the initial visit 
for the physician and prolonged detention or evalu-
ation is required to establish a diagnosis, determine 
the need for a specific surgical procedure, or prepare 
the patient; 
(ii) When the preoperative visit is a consultation 
and the consulting physician does not assume care 
of the patient; or 
(iii) When diagnostic procedures, not part of the 
basic surgical procedure, e.g., bronchoscopy prior to 
chest surgery, are provided during the immediate 
preoperative period. 
(h) Exploratory laparotomy procedures confirm a 
diagnosis and determine the extent of necessary 
treatment. A physician may request payment only if 
the exploratory procedure is the only procedure done 
during an operative session. Exploratory lapa-
rotomy services identified by CPT Codes 49000-
49060 may not be billed in conjunction with any 
services identified by the following CPT Codes: 
43500 - 44346 - 44600 - 45180 - 47400 - 47490 -
47600 - 48999 - 49002 - 49999 - 58140 - 58285 -
58400 - 58960. 
(i) The services of an assistant surgeon are cov-
ered only on very complex surgical procedures. Pro-
cedures not authorized for assistant surgeon cover-
age are listed in the Physician Provider Manual and 
updated by Medicaid Provider Bulletins as neces-
sary. Medicare guidelines for limitation of assistant 
surgeon coverage are used, since those decisions are 
made at the national level with physician consulta-
tion. 
(15) Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures: 
(a) Diagnostic needle procedures, e.g., lumbar 
puncture, thoracentesis, and jugular, femoral vein, 
or subdural taps, when performed as part of a 
necessary workup for a serious medical illness or 
injury, are covered in addition to other medical care 
on the same day. 
(b) Diagnostic "oscopy" procedures, e.g., endos-
copy, bronchoscopy, and laparoscopy, are covered 
separately from any major surgical procedure. How-
ever, when an "oscopy" procedure is done the same 
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day or at the same operative session as another 
procedure, the "oscopy" procedure may only be cov-
ered as a multiple procedure. 
(c) Magnetic resonance Tmngmg (MRI) is covered 
only for service to the brain, spinal cord, hip, thigh 
and abdomen. 
(d) Therapeutic needle procedures, e.g., scalp vein 
insertion, injections into cavities, nerve blocks, are 
covered in addition to other medical care on the 
same day. 
(e) Puncture of a cavity or joint for aspiration 
followed by injection of a medication is covered as 
one procedure and identified by specific CPT code. 
(16) Anesthesia Services: 
Anesthesia services are covered only when admin-
istered by a licensed anesthesiologist or nurse anes-
thetist who remains in attendance for the sole pur-
pose of rendering general anesthesia services. 
Standby or monitoring by the anesthesiologist or 
anesthetist during local anesthesia is not a covered 
Medicaid anesthesia service. 
(17) Transplant Services 
Organ transplant services are limited to those 
procedures for which selection criteria have been 
approved and documented in R414-10A. 
(18) Modifiers: 
Modifiers may be used only, as defined in the CPT 
Manual, to show that a service or procedure has 
been altered to some degree but not changed in 
definition or code. The following limitations apply: 
(1) The professional component, modifier 26, may 
be used only with laboratory and radiology service 
codes by a pathologist or radiologist and only when 
direct analysis, interpretation, and written report of 
findings are provided on a laboratory or radiology 
procedure. Private physicians may not use this 
modifier. 
(2) Unusual services are identified by use of modi-
fier 22, along with the appropriate CPT code. A 
prepayment review of unusual services shall be 
completed by Medicaid professional staff or physi-
cian consultants. A report of the service and any 
important supporting documentation must be sub-
mitted with the claim for review. 
(3) Anesthesia by surgeon is identified by use of 
modifier 47. The operating surgeon may not use 
modifier 47 in addition to the basic procedure code. 
Anesthesia provided by the surgeon is part of the 
basic procedure being provided. 
(4) Mandated services as defined by CPT and 
identified by modifier 32 are noncovered services. 
(5) Reference laboratory services identified by 
modifier 90 are noncovered services. 
(19) Medications: 
(a) DrugB and biologicals are limited to those 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Medicaid coverage of drugs and biologicals is 
based on individual need and orders written by a 
physician when the drug is given in accordance with 
accepted standards of medical practice and within 
the protocol of accepted use for the drug. 
(i) Generic drugs shall be used whenever a generic 
product approved by the FDA is available. If the 
physician determines that a brand name drug is 
medically necessary, the physician may override the 
generic requirement by writing on the prescription 
in his own hand writing "name brand medically 
necessary9. Preprinted messages, abbreviations, or 
notations by a second party, do not meet the override 
requirement. The pharmacist shall fiJil the prescrip-
tion with the generic equivalent product if the over-
ride procedure is not followed. 
(ii) Injectable medications approved in HCPCS are 
identified in the "J" code list published by the Health 
Care Financing Administration or the Department, 
or both. The list is reviewed and revised yearly and 
maintained in the Physician Provider Manual by 
notification and update through Medicaid Provider 
Bulletins. 
(iii) The "J" code covers only the cost of an ap-
proved product 
(iv) Office visits only for administration of medi-
cation are excluded from coverage. However, an 
injection code which covers the cost of the syringe, 
needle and administration of the medication may be 
used with the "J* code when medication administra-
tion is the only reason for an office call. 
(v) When an office service is provided for other 
purposes, in addition to medication administration, 
only the office visit and a "J" code may be used to bill 
for the service provided. 
(vi) The office visit code and injection code may 
never be used together. Only one of the codes may be 
used to define the service provided. 
(vii) Vitamin B-12 is limited to use only in treating 
conditions where physiological mechanisms produce 
pernicious anemia. Use of Vitamin B-12 in treating 
any unrelated condition is excluded from coverage. 
(b) Vitamins may be provided only for: 
(i) Pregnant women: Prenatal vitamins with 1 mg 
folic acid. 
(ii) Children through age five: Children's vitamins 
with fluoride. 
(iii) Children through age 15: Fluoride supple-
ment. 
(c) Human growth stimulating hormones are not a 
covered service. 
(d) Methylphenidates, amphetamines, and other 
central nervous system stimulants require prior 
authorization and may be provided only for treat-
ment of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) in children 
between the ages of six and 18 years. 
(e) Medications for appetite suppression are not a 
covered service. 
(f) Non-prescription, over-the-counter items are 
limited, and notification of changes consistent with 
this rule is made by Provider Bulletin and Provider 
Manual updates. 
(g) Nutrients may be provided only as established 
inR414-24A. 
References: 26-1-5, 26-18-3. 
History: 11442, NEW, see CPR; 11442, CPR, 04/15/91; 
17705, AMD, 06/07/96. 
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g. Vitamin B-12 is limited to use only in treating 
conditions where physiological mechanisms produce 
pernicious anemia. Use of Vitamin B-12 in treating 
any unrelated condition is excluded from coverage. 
2. Vitamins may be provided only for: 
a. Pregnant women: Prenatal vitamins with 1 mg 
folic acid. 
b. Children through age 5: Childrens' vitamins 
with fluoride. 
c. Children through age 15: Fluoride supplement. 
3. Human growth stimulating hormones are not a 
covered Medicaid benefit. 
4. Methylphenidates, amphetamines, and other 
central nervous system stimulants require prior 
authorization and may be provided only for treat-
ment of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) in children 
between the ages of 6 and 18 years. 
5. Medications for appetite suppression are not a 
benefit of the Medicaid program. 
6. Non-prescription, over-the-counter items are 
limited and notification of changes consistent with 
this rule are made by Provider Bulletin and Provider 
Manual updates. 
7. Nutrients may be provided only as established 
in Utah Medicaid intravenous therapy rules. 
M4J4-1D~7* PriorAuthorization, 
A. Selected medical and surgical procedures, as 
documented in the Medical and Surgical Procedures 
Prior Authorization List, and incorporated in indi-
vidual provider agreements, require prior authori-
zation. 
B. Prior authorization, consent, and other sup-
porting documentation are required for medical ne-
cessity and appropriateness of sterilization, hyster-
ectomy and abortion procedures to be established by 
the Bureau of Managed Health Care, Utilization 
Management staff. This is required by 42 CFR Part 
441, Subparts E and F, October 1989 edition. 
C. The Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior 
Authorization List, maintained in the Physician 
Provider Manual and updated by Medicaid Provider 
Bulletins as necessary, defines the prior authoriza-
tion requirements for specific procedures referenced 
in A and B above. 
D. Telephone Prior Authorization is available for 
selected procedures. The Medical and Surgical Pro-
cedures Prior Authorization List identifies the pro-
cedures and the requirements for telephone prior 
authorization. 
quire prior authorization. 
F. Outpatient Psychiatric services, provided by an 
individual physician provider, require prior authori-
zation after the first 12 services in each calendar 
year. 
G. Surgical procedures which require prior autho-
rization and are performed under emergency cir-
cumstances require an "after-the-fact authoriza-
tion."The procedures to follow when seeking such an 
authorization are found on the introductory key to 
the Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior Authori-
zation List. 
H. All services related to organ transplant proce-
dures require prior authorization. An "after-the-fact 
Authorization"may not be considered. 
I. Intensive, inpatient hospital physical rehabili-
tation services require prior authorization. 
1*414-10-8. Reimbursement . 
A. Reimbursement for physician services may be 
Provided only in accordance with a specific provider 
Agreement. 
B. The physician may seek reimbursement, in 
Accordance with Utah Administrative Code R414-
^5-1 and R414-45-2, only for services that were 
Personally rendered by the physician or were ren-
dered incident to the physician's professional service 
^y a physician in training, a nurse practitioner, or a 
Physician assistant under personal supervision. The 
Acceptable standard for personal supervision is 
Availability by telephone, when the physician has a 
Written protocol embodying supervisory procedures. 
The personal supervision requirement must be met 
Mth respect to every nonphysician service provided 
**i the course of treatment prescribed by any physi-
cian for any Medicaid client. Medical charts must 
Have signed documentation sufficient to reflect ac~ 
^ive participation of the physician in managing, 
®ro viding and supervising all aspects of patient can -
treatment, 
v C. In accordance with Utah Administrative Code 
A414-4X, payment may be made only when a covered 
^rvice has been provided directly to a patient. 
reimbursement may not be requested when a pa-
rent fails to keep a scheduled appointment. 
References: 26-1-5, 26-18-3. 
History: 11442, NEW, see CPR; 11442, CPR, 04/15/9L^ 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
^reast reduction surgery. 
Breast reduction surgery is authorized in particular 
J^ses of "medical necessity." Therefore, because the per 
Rent's attending physicians testified regarding the medical 
Necessity of the procedure and the Department of Health 
Nare Finance failed to give a reasoned basis for declining to 
>ive deference to the testimony of the treating physician, 
/ne agency's finding that the breast reduction surgery waa 
%t medically necessary was not supported by substantial 
Vdence and was reversed. (R414-10-6.) A.M.L. v. Depart-
ment of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin., 863 P.2d 44 (Utah 
k App. 1993). 
^414-lOA, Transplant Services Standard*.! 
x 
R414-10A-1. Policy Statement. 
R414-10A-2. Authority. 
R414-10A-3. Definitions. 
414-10A-4. Client Eligibility Requirements for Coverafl 
Rfor Transplantation Services. 
R414-10A-5. Program Access Requirements. 
R414-10A-6. Service Coverage. 
R414-10A-7. Prior Authorization. ^ ^ 
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Breast reduction surgery. 
Breast reduction surgery is authorized in particular 
cases of "medical necessity." Therefore, because the pa-
tient's attending physicians testified regarding the medical 
necessity of the procedure and the Department of Health 
Care Finance failed to give a reasoned basis for declining to 
give deference to the testimony of the treating physician, 
the agency's finding that the breast reduction surgery was 
not medically necessary was not supported by substantial 
evidence and was reversed. CR414-10-6.) A.M.L. v. Depart-
ment of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin^ 863 R2d 44 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
R414-10A. .Transplant Services Standards. 
R414-10A-1. Policy Statement. 
R414-10A-2. Authority. 
JU14-1DA-3. Detentions. 
R414-10A-4. Client Eligibility. Requirements for Coverage 
for Transplantation Services. 
R414-10A-5. Program Access Requirements. 
R414-1QA-6. Service Coverage. 
R414-10A-7. Prior Authorization. 
R414-1QA-3. Criteria for Transplantation Centers or Fa-
cilities. 
R414-10A-9. Criteria and Contraindications for Cornea 
Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-10. Criteria and Contraindications for Bone 
Marrow Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-11. Criteria and Contraindications for Heart 
Transplantation. 
R414-10A-12. Criteria and Contraindications for Intestine 
Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-13. Criteria and Contraindications for Kidney 
Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-14. Criteria and Contraindications for liver 
Transplantation. 
R414-10A-15. Criteria and Contraindications for Lung 
Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-16. Criteria and Contraindications for Pancreas 
Transplantation. 
R414-10A-17. Criteria and Contraindications for Small 
Bowel Transplantation. 
R414-10A-18. Criteria and Contraindications for Heart 
and Lung Transplantation. 
R414-10A-19. Criteria and Contraindications for Intestine 
and Liver Transplantation. 
R414-10A-20. Criteria and Contraindications for Kidney-
Pancreas Transplantation. 
R414-10A-21. Criteria and Contraindications for Liver 
and Kidney Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-22. Criteria and Contraindications for 
Multivisceral Transplantation. 
R414-10A-23. Criteria and Contraindications for Liver 
and Small Bowel Transplantation. 
R414-1QA-24. Criteria and Contraindications for Other 
Tissues, Organs, and Multiple Organ Transplantations 
for Clients Under The Age of 21 Years Not Specifically 
Set Forth in This Rule. 
R414-10A-1. Policy Statement. 
(1) This rule establishes standards and criteria for 
tissue and organ transplantation in the treatment of 
progressive or life threatening disease. 
(2) Transplantation services include inpatient 
hospital, physician, laboratory, outpatient surgical, 
and other approved services necessary to accomplish 
selected transplantation. 
B4U-1GA-2. Authority. 
Transplantation services for persons age 21 and 
over are optional Medicaid, Title XIX services. Sec-
tion 9507 of the federal Consolidated Omnibus Bud-
get Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), codified as 
section 1903(iXD of the Social Security Act, requires 
states, as part of the Medicaid program, to establish 
standards for coverage of transplantation services. 
Medically necessary transplantation services are 
mandated by section 1905(rX5) of the Sodal Secu-
rity Act, for persons under age 21. 
R4U-10A-3. Definitions. 
For purposes of R414-10A: 
(1) "Abstinence" means the documented non-use of 
any abusable psychoactive substance. 
(2) "Active infection* means current presumptive 
evidence of invasion of tissue or body fluids by 
bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or parasites 
which is not demonstrated to be effectively con-
trolled by the host, antibiotic or antimicrobial 
agents. 
(3) "Age group" means patients documented in the 
medical literature with an age at the time of trans-
plantation related to the current age of the client as 
listed below: 
(a) Birth through 12 months; 
(b) One through 12 years; 
(c) 13 through 20 years; 
(d) 21 through 30 years; 
(e) 31 through 40 years; or 
(f) 41 through 54 years. 
(g) Department medical consultants may consider 
othejr age groups, documented by the medical litera-
ture and the transplant center to have conclusive 
relevance to the client's survival 
(4) "Active substance abuse* means the current 
use of any abusable psychoactive substance which is 
not appropriately prescribed and taken under the 
direction of a physician or is not medically indicated. 
(5) "Allogenic* means having a different genetic 
constitution but belonging" to the same species. 
(6) 'Autologous" means the products or compo-
nents of the same individual person. 
(7) "Chronic myelogenous leukemia in chronic 
phaije* means chronologically the first phase of 
chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML). CML is gen-
erally divided into three stages: chronic phase, ac-
celerated phase, and blast crisis. The median dura-
tion of the chronic phase of CML is about 45 months, 
but the range is wide and varies from a few months 
to m.ore than 20 years. The presence of one or more 
of the following documents the end of the chronic 
pha*e and the beginning of the accelerated phase: 
(a) Difficulty maintaining control of the white 
blood count, 
(b) Increasing numbers of blood basophils and 
eosinophils, 
(cj Increasing percentages of marrow promyelo-
cytes and blast cells, 
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(d) Increasing anemia, 
(e) Falling platelet count, 
(f) Persistent thrombocytosis greater than 
1067mm3, 
(g) Karyotypic abnormalities in addition to Phila-
delphia chromosome, 
(h) Increasing spleen size, 
(i) Extramedullary disease including leukemic 
nodules or chloromas, 
(j) Increasing myelofibrosis, 
(k) Lymphadenopathy, 
(I) Bone pain, 
(m) Unexplained fever, 
(n) Unexplained weight loss, 
(o) Night sweats, 
(p) Hypercalcemia. 
(8) "Client" means an individual eligible to receive 
covered Medicaid services from an enrolled Medic-
aid provider. 
(9) "Department" means the Utah Department of 
Health. 
(10) "Emergency transplantation" means any 
transplantation which for reasons of medical neces-
sity requires that a transplant be performed less 
than five days after determination of the need for 
the procedure. 
(II) "End stage lung disease" means a progressive 
lung disorder that results in any one of the follow-
ing: 
(a) Three liters per minute or more of oxygen is 
required to maintain an oxygen saturation of the 
hemoglobin at greater than or equal to 90 percent. 
(b) PC02 greater than or equal to 65 mmHg. in the 
arterial blood or in arterialized capillary blood 
samples. 
(c) Vital capacity of less than 50 percent of pre-
dicted for age, height, weight, and gender. 
(d) Forced expiratory flow^^ (FEF^.^) of less 
than 20 percent of predicted that is not reversible 
with bronchodilators. 
(e) Evidence of cor pulmonale by any one or more 
of the following: 
(i) EKG 
(ii) Echocardiogram 
(iii) Cardiac catheterization. 
(12) "End stage renal disease" means: 
(a) clients 19 years of age or older who have any 
one or more of the following: 
(i) a serum creatinine consistently above or equal 
to 6 mg. per deciliter. 
(ii) a serum creatinine between 4.5 and 6 mg per 
deciliter with symptomatic uremia. 
(iii) a serum creatinine rising one mg. per deciliter 
per month. 
(iv) a creatinine clearance below or equal to 8 mg. 
per minute or 
(v) chronic renal failure requiring renal dialysis; 
or 
(b) in clients 18 years of age or less, a creatinine 
clearance from 10 to 15 cubic centimeters per 
minute per 1.73 meters square body surface area 
with symptomatic uremia, and less than 10 cubic 
centimeters per minute per 1.73 meters square body 
surface area whether or not symptoms have oc-
curred. 
(13) "Intestine transplantation" means transplan-
tation of both the small bowel and colon. 
(14) "Irreversible, progressive, liver disease* 
means liver disease associated with any one of the 
following: 
(a) a serum albumin of less than 2.6 g/dL; 
(b) a persistent serum bilirubin of 8 mg/dL; 
(c) a coagulopathy unresponsive to vitamin K 
therapy; 
(d) chronic portosystemic encephalopathy; 
(e) gastric esophageal varices with Child's classi-
fication grade C, adopted and incorporated by refer-
ence; or 
(f) medically refractory ascites associated with 
hepatic fibrosis, or cirrhosis, or both. 
(15) "Medical literature" means jarticles and medi-
cal information which have been |>eer reviewed and 
accepted for publication or published. 
(16) "Medically necessary" means a client's medi-
cal condition which meets all the criteria and none of 
the contraindications for the type of transplantation 
requested. 
(17) "Morbid obesity" means the weight equal to or 
greater than the values specified in Table I for males 
and Table II for females found at 20 CFR 404, 
Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 10.10, April 1992 
edition, which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
(18) "Multiple transplantations1 means, except for 
corneas, the transplantation of more than one tissue 
or organ during the same or different operative 
procedure. 
(19) "Multivisceral transplantation" means the 
transplantation of liver, pancreas, omentum, stom-
ach, small intestine and colon. 
(20) "Patient" means a client who is receiving 
covered professional services provided or directed by 
a licensed practitioner of the healing arts enrolled as 
a Medicaid provider. 
(21) "Remission" means the lack of any evidence of 
the leukemia on physical examination and hemato-
logical evaluation, including normocellular bone 
marrow with less than five percent blast cells, and 
peripheral blood counts within normal values, ex-
cept for clients who are receiving maintenance che-
motherapy. 
(22) "Services" means the type of medical assis-
tance specified in sections 1905(a)(1) through (24) of 
the Social Security Act and interpreted in the 42 
CFR Section 440, Subpart A, October 1992 edition, 
which is adopted and incorporated by reference. 
(23) "Substance abuse rehabilitation program" 
means a rehabilitation program developed and con-
ducted by an inpatient facility that, at a minimum, 
meets the standards of organization and staff of a 
chemical dependency/substance abuse specialty hos-
pital specified in R432-102-4,5. 
(24) "Syngeneic" means possessing identical geno-
types, as monozygotic or identical twins. 
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(25) Transplantation" means the transfer of a 
human organ or tissue from one person to another or 
from one site to another in the same individual, 
except for skin and bone. 
(26) "Vital end-organs* means organs of the body 
essential to life, e.g., the heart, the liver, the lungs, 
and the brain. 
R414-1QA-4. Client Eligibility Requirements 
for Coverage for Transplantation Services. 
- - Transplantation services are available to categori-
cally eligible and medically needy individuals who 
are Title XIX eligible and meet criteria established 
in R414-10A-7 through 24 at the time the transplan-
tation service is provided. 
R414-10A-5. Program Access Requirements. 
(1) Transplantation services may be provided only 
for those eligible clients who meet the criteria estab-
lished by R414-10A-7 through 24 for services cov-
ered under the Utah Medicaid program. 
(2) Transplantation services for the organ needed 
by the client may be provided only in a transplant 
center approved by the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services as a Medicare desig-
nated center or by the Department in accordance 
with criteria in R414-10A-8. 
(3) Transplantation services may be provided out-
of-state only when the authorized service is not 
available in an approved facility in the state of Utah. 
(4) Criteria established by R414-10A applicable to 
transplantation services and transplant centers in 
the state of Utah also apply to out-of-state trans-
plant services and facilities. 
(5) Post transplant authorization for transplanta-
tion services provided under unusual, emergency 
circumstances may be given only when: 
(a) all Utah Medicaid criteria established by R414-
10A-7 through 24 are met; and 
(b) both the transplant center and the board-
certified specialist evaluation required by .E414-
10A-7(4)(f), (p), (q), and (r) are submitted with the 
recommendation that the tissue or organ transplan-
tation be authorized. 
(6) Telephone prior authorization for corneal 
transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty may be 
given only when the client's referring physician 
provides: 
(a) the information required by R414-10A-7(4Xa) 
and(b), 
(b) the information required by R414-10A-
KlXfXi) and (ii), 
(c) the information required by R414-10A-9Q) and 
(2), and 
(d) any additional medical information that could 
affect outcome of the corneal transplantation which 
is requested for review by the Department. 
(7) Telephone Prior Authorization for corneal 
transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty must be 
followed by the written Prior Authorization Request 
Form 24-06-37, completed and signed by the physi-
cian. The written request, with the supporting docu-
mentation required by R414-10A-9, must be re-
ceived by the Department before payment will be 
made. 
R414-10A-6. Service Coverage. 
(1) Transplantation services are covered by the 
Utah Medicaid program only when criteria estab-
lished by R414-10A-7 through 24 are met. 
(2) Transplantations which are experimental or 
investigational or which are performed on an experi-
mental or investigational basis. 
(3) Multiple transplantation services may be pro-
vided only when the criteria for the specific multiple 
transplantations are met. 
(4) Staff shall not consider criteria for single tissue 
or organ transplantation in reviewing requests for 
multiple transplantations. 
(5) Transplantation of additional tissues or or-
gans, different from prior transplantations, may be 
provided only when the criteria for multiple trans-
plantations of all provided or scheduled multiple 
tissue or organ transplantations are met. 
(6) Repeat transplantations of the same tissues or 
organs may be provided only when documentation 
reviewed by Department staff and medical consult-
ants shows that criteria for transplantation of the 
specific tissues or organs are met 
(7) Emergency transplantations may be provided 
only when the service is provided for a transplanta-
tion with criteria approved in R414-10A-7 through 
24. Payment will not be made until Department 
staff has reviewed all of the information required by 
R414-10A-7 through 24 and determined that the 
patient and the transplant center met criteria for 
approval and provision of the service at the time of 
the transplantation. 
R414-10A-7. Prior Authorization. 
(1) Prior authorization is required for all trans-
plantation services. 
(2) Prior authorization for corneal transplantation 
must be in accordance with R414-10A-9. 
(3) The prior authorization request for transplan-
tation services must be initiated by the client's 
referring physician. Failure to submit ail required 
information with the prior authorization request 
will delay processing of the request for transplanta-
tion. 
(4) The initial request for prior authorization of 
any transplantation, except cornea, must contain all 
of the following information and documentation: 
(a) Request for Prior Authorization Form 24-06-
37, completed and signed by the physician. 
(b) A description of the medical condition which 
necessitates a transplantation. 
(c) The client's prognosis, with and without a 
transplant, including estimated life expectancy. 
(d) Transplantation treatment alternatives uti-
lized previous to the transplantation request. 
(e) Transplantation treatment alternatives con-
sidered and discarded, including discussion of why 
the alternatives have been discarded. 
(f) Comprehensive examination, evaluation and 
recommendations completed by a board-certified or 
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board-eligible specialist in a field directly related to 
the client's condition which necessitates the trans-
plantation, such as a nephrologist, gastroenterolo-
gist, cardiologist, or hematologist 
(g) Comprehensive psycho-social evaluation of the 
client by a board-certified or board-eligible psychia-
trist The evaluation must include a comprehensive 
history regarding substance abuse and compliance 
with medical treatment 
(h) Psycho-social evaluation of parentis; or guard-
ian(s) of the client, by a board-certified or board-
eligible psychiatrist if the client is less than 18 years 
of age. The psycho-social evaluation must include a 
comprehensive history regarding substance abuse, 
and past and present compliance with medical treat-
ment 
(i) Comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of the 
client, if the client has a history of mental illness. 
(j) Comprehensive psychological or developmental 
testing, as requested by the Department 
(k) Comprehensive infectious disease evaluation 
for a client with a recent or current suspected 
infectious episode. 
(1) Current dental consultation. 
(m) Complete blood count with differential and 
platelet count, prothrombin time, partial thrombo-
plastin time, urinalysis, SMA 20, ABO blood anti-
bodies, human leukocyte antigen typing, arterial 
blood gases, purified protein derivative skin test, 
chest X-ray, pulmonary function tests, electrocardio-
gram, echocardiogram, urinary drug screen, titers 
for toxoplasmosis, hepatitis B and C, human immu-
nodeficiency virus, cytomegalovirus, Epstein-Barr 
virus, herpes viruses, and fungi 
(n) Documentation by the client's referring physi-
cian that a client with a history of substance abuse 
has successfully completed a substance abuse pro-
gram or has documented abstinence for a period of 
at least six months before any transplantation ser-
vice can be authorized. 
(o) Hospital and outpatient records for at least the 
last two years, unless the patient is less than two 
years of age, in which case all records. 
(p) Any other medical evidence needed to evaluate 
possible contraindications for the type of transplan-
tation being considered. Contraindications are listed 
in this rule under each selected organ or transplant 
type. 
(q) The transplant center must document, by a 
current medical literature review, a one-year sur-
vival rate for patients transplantation for the age 
group, specific diagnosisCes), condition and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client Survival 
rate must be calculated by the Kaplan-Meier prod-
uct-limit method or the actuarial life table method: 
"Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation 
from incomplete observations. Journal of American 
Statistical Association 53:457-481, 1958. Cox, D i t , 
Oakes, D. Analysis of survival data. Chapman and 
Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated by reference. 
At least ten patients in the appropriate age group 
must be alive at the end of the one or three year 
period to document adequate confidence intervals. 
The Department shall use independent research by 
staff medical consultants to evaluate the documen-
tation submitted by the transplant center. 
(r) The transplant center must document by a 
current medical literature review, a one year graft 
function rate for patients having received pancreas, 
kidney or small bowel transplantation for the age 
group, specific diagnosis(e8), condition, and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client Graft func-
tion rate must be calculated by the Kaplan-Meier 
product-limit method or the actuarial life table 
method: "Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric esti-
mation from incomplete observations. Journal of 
American Statistical Association 53:457-481, 1958. 
Cox, DJt, Oakes, D. Analysis of survival data. 
Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated 
by reference. The time to graft failure will be deter-
mined by the use of insulin post-pancreas transplan-
tation, by the use of dialysis post-renal transplanta-
tion, and the use of total parenteral nutrition post-
small bowel transplantation. At least 10 patients in 
the appropriate age group must have documented 
graft function at the end of the one year period to 
document adequate confidence intervals. The De-
partment shall use independent research by staff 
medical consultants to evaluate the documentation 
submitted by the transplant center. 
(s) Bone marrow transplantation centers must 
document, by a current medical literature review, a 
one-year and a three-year survival rate from pa-
tients having received transplantation for the age 
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client The Depart-
ment shall use independent research by staff medi-
cal consultants to evaluate the documentation sub-
mitted by the transplant center. 
(t) The transplant center must provide written 
recommendations for each client which support the 
need for the transplant The recommendations must 
reflect use of both the transplant center's own pa-
tient selection criteria and the Utah Medicaid pro-
gram criteria as noted in R414-10A-9 through 24. 
Agreement of the transplant center to provide the 
required service must also be established. 
(u) The physician must provide, for review by the 
Department, any additional medical information 
which could affect the outcome of the specific trans-
plant being requested. 
(v) The completed request for authorization, along 
with all required information and documentation, 
must be delivered to: 
Utah Department of Health 
Bureau of Managed Health Care 
Prior Authorization Unit 
Transplant Coordinator 
288 North 1460 West 
P.O. Box 16580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580. 
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R414-1QA-8. Criteria for Transplantation Cen-
ters or Facilities. 
(1) Transplantation services are covered only in a 
transplant center or facility which demonstrates the 
following qualifications to the Department: 
(a) Compliance with criteria established by R414-
10A-7 through 24. 
(b) The transplant center must document cost 
effectiveness and quality of service. The transplant 
center must complete, and submit to the Depart-
ment for evaluation, documentation specific to the 
surgical experience of the requesting transplant 
center, showing applicable one and three year sur-
vival rates for all patients receiving transplantation 
in the last three years. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants 
to evaluate the documentation submitted by the 
transplant center. 
(c) Out-of-state transplant centers must meet all 
of the criteria and requirements established by the 
Department in R414-10A-7 through 24. 
(d) Transplantation services are covered in out-of-
state transplant centers only when the service is not 
available in an approved facility in Utah, and agree-
ment is reached between the Department and the 
requesting physician that service out-of-state is es-
sential to the individual case. 
(e) Reimbursement to out-of-state transplant cen-
ters is provided only when the transplant center and 
the Department can agree upon arrangements 
which reasonably conform to the Department pay-
ment methodology. 
(f) Corneal transplant facilities must document: 
(i) certification or licensure by the Department as 
an ambulatory surgical center or an acute care 
general hospital; and 
(ii) that the surgeon is board-certified or board-
eligible in ophthalmology. 
(g) Heart, kidney, and liver transplant centers 
must document all of the following: 
(i) Current approval by the UJS. Department of 
Health and Human Services as a Medicare-desig-
nated center for transplantation of the organ needed 
by the client. 
(ii) Current full membership in the United Net-
work for Organ Sharing for the specific organ trans-
plantation needed by the client. 
(h) Bone marrow transplant centers must docu-
ment the following: 
(i) Approval to provide autologous or allogenic 
bone marrow transplantation from at least one of 
the following: 
(A) Children's Cancer Study Group approval as a 
bone marrow transplantation center for autologous 
or allogenic bone marrow. 
(B) Southwest Oncology Group approval as a bone 
marrow transplantation center for autologous or 
allogenic bone marrow. 
(C) National Marrow Donor Program approval as 
a bone marrow transplantation center for allogenic 
bone marrow. 
(ii) Payment will be made for autologous bone 
marrow transplantation services only if the trans-
plantation center can document approval by at least 
one of the agencies named in R414-10A-8(lXhXiXA) 
or (B) of this rule as an approved autologous bone 
marrow transplantation center. 
(iii) Payment will be made for allogenic bone 
marrow transplantation services only if the trans-
plantation center can document approval by at least 
one of the agencies named in R414-lQA-8(lXhXiXA) 
through (C) of this rule as an approved allogenic 
bone marrow transplant center. 
(i) Lung transplant centers must have a current 
full membership in the United Network for Organ 
Sharing for lung transplantation. 
R414-10A-9. Criteria and Contraindications for 
Cornea Transplantation. 
(1) Cornea transplantation services may be pro-
vided to a client of any age. 
(2) Cornea transplantation or penetrating kerato-
plasty must be prior authorized by the Department. 
The following documentation for prior authorization 
is required: 
(a) prior Authorization Request Form 24-06-37, 
completed and signed by the physician; 
(b) a description of the medical condition which 
necessitates a transplantation; and 
(c) documentation that indicates a probability of 
successful clinical outcome. 
(3) The following are contraindications for cornea 
transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty: 
(a) Active infection. 
(b) The presence of an associated disease, such as 
macular degeneration or diabetic retinopathy severe 
enough to prevent visual improvement with a suc-
cessful corneal transplantation. 
R414-10A-10. Criteria and Contraindications 
for Bone Marrow Transplantat ion. 
(1) Bone marrow transplantation services may be 
provided only for a client who is less than 21 years of 
age at the time a written prior authorization appli-
cation for transplantation is received by the Depart-
ment. 
(2) The client for bone marrow transplantation 
must meet requirements of R414-10A-10(2Xa) or (b). 
(a) Allogenic and syngeneic bone marrow trans-
plantations may be approved for payment only when 
the client has an HLA-matched donor. The donor 
must be compatible for all or & five-out-of-six match 
of World Health Organization recognized HLA-A, -B, 
and -DR antigens as determined by appropriate 
serologic typing methodology. 
(i) A search of related family members, for a 
suitable donor, is authorized for payment only after 
a written prior authorization request has been re-
ceived by the Department. 
(ii) A search of unrelated persons by HLA-type, for 
a suitable donor, will not be authorized for payment 
by the Department until the client has been docu-
mented to meet all other criteria in this rule for bone 
marrow transplantation except an HLA-matched 
donor. 
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(iii) The transplant center staff must complete, 
and submit to the Department for evaluation, a 
current medical literature review, documenting a 
TTiflYiTTtmn probability of successful clinical outcome 
by having a greater than or equal to 75 percent 
one-year survival rate, or by having a greater than 
or equal to 55 percent three-year survival rate or by 
meeting the one-year and three-year survival rates 
for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation 
for the age group, specific diagnosiB(es), and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client The Depart-
ment shall use independent research by staff medi-
cal consultants to evaluate the documentation sub-
mitted by the transplant center. 
(b) Autologous bone marrow or peripheral blood 
stem cell transplantation performed in conjunction 
with total body radiation or high dose chemotherapy, 
may be approved for payment only if a current 
medical literature review, completed by the trans-
plant center staff and sent to the Department for 
staff review and evaluation, documenting a maxi-
mum probability of successful clinical outcome by 
having a greater than or equal to 75 percent one-
year survival rate, or by having a greater than or 
equal to 55 percent three-year survival rate or by 
meeting the one-year and three-year survival rates 
for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation 
for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client The Depart-
ment shall use independent research by staff medi-
cal consultants to evaluate the documentation sub-
mitted by the transplant center. 
(c) Clients for autologous bone marrow transplan-
tations must have adequate marrow function and no 
evidence of marrow involvement by the primary 
malignancy at the time the marrow is harvested. 
(3) In addition to meeting the requirements of 
R414-10A-10(2Xa) or (b), the client for bone marrow 
transplantation must meet the requirements of at 
least R414-10A-l<X3Xa) or (b). 
(a) The client must have irreversible, progressive 
bone marrow disease with a life expectancy of one 
year or less without transplantation or must have 
greater than a five year increase in life expectancy 
with transplantation, with no other reasonable 
medical or surgical alternative to transplantation 
available. 
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and 
submit to the Department for staff review and 
evaluation, a medical literature review documenting 
that the client's condition will cause irreversible, 
progressive disease to vital end-organs within two 
years following the application for transplant and 
have no other reasonable medical or surgical alter-
native to transplantation available. The medical 
literature must also document that the bone marrow 
transplantation will prevent irreversible, progres-
sive disease to the client's vital end-organs and must 
document that it will increase the life expectancy of 
the client by greater than five years. The Depart-
ment shall use independent research by staff medi-
cal consultants to evaluate the documentation sub-
mitted by the transplant center. 
(4) In addition to meeting the requirements listed 
in R414-10A-10, (1) through (3), the client must 
meet all of the following requirements: 
(a) Medical assessment that the client is a reason-
able risk for surgery with a likelihood of tolerance 
for immunosuppressive therapy. 
(b) Medical assessment by the client's referring 
physician that the client has sufficient mental, emo-
tional and social stability and support to ensure that 
he and his parentis) or guardian(a) will strictly 
adhere to the long-term follow-up and the immuno-
suppressive program which is required. 
(c) Psycho-social assessment by a Isoard-certified 
or board-eligible psychiatrist that the client has 
sufficient mental, emotional and social stability and 
support to ensure that he and his parentis) or 
guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the long-term 
follow-up and the immunosuppressive program 
which is required. 
(d) The client must have a strong motivation to 
undergo the procedure as documented by the medi-
cal and psycho-social assessment 
(e) If the client has a history of substance abuse, 
then the client must successfully complete a sub-
stance abuse program or must have documented 
abstinence for a period of at least six months before 
the Department reviews a request for transplanta-
tion services. 
(f) A current medical literature review, completed 
by the transplant center staff and submitted to the 
Department for staff review and evaluation, docu-
menting that the underlying original bone marrow 
disease will not recur and limit survival to less than 
75% one-year survival rate, or to less than 55% 
three-year survival rate. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants 
to evaluate the documentation submitted by the 
transplant center. 
(5) Any single contraindication listed below pre-
cludes approval for Medicaid payment for bone mar-
row transplantation: 
(a) Active infection. 
(b) Acute severe hemodynamic compromise at the 
tJTTiA of transplantation if accompanied by signifi-
cant compromise of one or more vital end-organs. 
(c) Active substance abuse. 
(d) Presence of systemic dysfunction or malignant 
disease which could Emit successful clinical outcome 
or interfere with compliance with a disciplined 
medical regimen or rehabilitation afbsr transplanta-
tion. 
(e) Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) anti-
body positive. 
(f) Neuropsychiatric disorder which could lead to 
non-compliance or inhibit rehabilitation of the pa-
tient 
(g) Pulmonary diseases: 
(i) Cystic fibrosis. 
(ii) Obstructive pulmonary disease (FEV1 less 
than 50% of predictable). 
(iii) Restrictive pulmonary disease (FVC less than 
50% of predictable). 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Case No. 98-033-47 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD 
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS 
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A 
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE 
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576. 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department of 
Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing 
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and 
Providers." 
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No. 98-033-47 in its entirety. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. 
Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Coun of Appeals within thirty 
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is 
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall 
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon 
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may 
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order. 
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last 
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this H day of October 1998 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF^HEALTH 
2 
HPT 9 M 9 3 
f ^ A O r S . ; * ' ; -^LDEfAB 
BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL/ 
SEAN DAUGAARD 
Petitioner, 
vs. RECOMMENDED DECISION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Case No. 98-033-47 
Margaret J. Clark 
Administrative Law Judge 
Respondent. 
Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administrative 
Hearing Procedures Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a 
formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on August 12, 1998. at 
9:30 a.m., in Room 344, Cannon Health Building, 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake City. 
Utah 84116, Margaret J. Clark, Administrative Law Judge, presiding. The petitioner was 
represented by David Erickson, Attorney at Law. The respondent was represented by Robert 
Stewart, Staff Attorney for the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF), Utah Depanment 
of Health. Bernadette McNally and Richard Fairbourn testified on behalf of Primary 
Children's Hospital ("PCMC"). 
ISSUE 
WAS DHCF CORRECT IN DENYING REIMBURSEMENT TO PCMC FOR A BONE 
MARROW TRANSPLANT FOR LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Sean was admitted to PCMC for preparation for a bone marrow transplant on July 8, 1997, 
and for the transplant itself on July 17, 1997. Sean was discharged from PCMC on September 
19, 1997. 
2. On or about September 19, 1997, Dr. Ted Keyes, a treating physician of Sean's, 
submitted a prior authorization request form on his behalf. 
3. Richard Fairbourn, who worked as a resource counselor for PCMC in July 1997, had 
worked with Sean's family in March 1997 to establish financial eligibility for Medicaid. 
4. On July 9, 1997, the day after Sean was admitted to PCMC, his family had not received a 
medical card for the month of July and one had not yet been issued. 
5. When Mr. Fairbourn routinely checked the State's computer on July 9, 1997, he was 
concerned when it appeared to him that Sean did not have Medicaid eligibility. At that time he 
went to Debbie Lucero, a state eligibility worker at PCMC and asked her why Sean did not 
have Medicaid eligibility. 
6. Mr. Fairbourn asked Debbie Lucero how Sean could have a history of Medicaid eligibility 
and then not show it on the States's eligibility computer on July 9, 1997. 
7. In light of to Ms. Lucero's response that the case was in review status and needed a new 
eligibility application, Mr. Fairbourn asked Sean's mother to complete a new eligibility 
application. When it was completed, Mr. Fairbourn personally took it to Debbie Lucero and 
handed it to her on July 9, 1997. 
9. On July 9, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn. typed the following note into the hospital computer: 
"PEND: NDCD APP with DEB [see Petitioner's Exhibit 3]. 
10. Mr. Fairbourn was not aware that Sean's eligibility status was confirmed later on July 9 
and a letter so stating went out to the client on that date [see Respondent's Exhibit 10-4 ]. 
11. On August 1, 1997, when Mr. Fairbourn was routinely reviewing his accounts, he learned 
for the first time that the State computer showed Medicaid eligibility for Sean for July and 
August. 
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12. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn typed the note into the hospital computer: "CAID 
ELIG FOR D.O.S." so employees at PCMC could have access to that knowledge. 
13. Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairbourn when cases become eligible. Although 
Ms. Lucero knew this case involved a large amount of money, she failed to inform Mr. 
Fairbourn of Sean's eligibility. 
14. The prior authorization request form was signed on September 19, 1997, and received by 
DHCF on 10-29-97 [see Respondent's Exhibit 11]. 
RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. I recommend that denial of reimbursement for Sean Daugaard's bone marrow transplant be 
AFFIRMED because there is nothing in the record to indicate Ms. Lucero had an affirmative 
duty to keep PCMC apprised of new eligibility approvals, although that had been her custom. 
Having known the financial impact of this case, PCMC was not diligent in following through 
with tracking eligibility status. 
2. Based upon the hearing record as a whole, including PCMC's lack of diligence in tracking 
the eligibility and filing the prior authorization request, does not rise to the level of unusual 
circumstances or equitable estoppel. 
REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION 
Petitioner contended that on July 9, 1997, Medicaid eligibility for July had not been 
authorized. 
Petitioner also contended that the pertinent part of the transplant rule R410-10A-4(5), which 
pertains to prior authorization is ambiguous. That section states: 
Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided under 
unusual, emergency circumstances may be given [when all other criteria are 
met]; emphasis added. 
Petitioner contended that with the comma between unusual and emergency circumstances, a 
reasonable reading would be to consider the meaning to be "unusual OR emergency 
3 
circumstances." 
Finally the petitioner argued that the state should be estopped from now saying that PCMC 
should have sent in a prior authorization request form. 
Respondent contended that there was never a break in Sean's medical eligibility and that this 
should have been obvious to PCMC. 
Mr. Stewart stated in his opening argument that the State had previously suspended prior 
authorization requirements "when a provider was unaware that a patient was going to be a 
Medicaid recipient, and in doing so DHCF had followed R410-10A-4(5) which allows post 
transplant authorization "under unusual, emergency circumstances" circumstances [Tr. at 15]. 
Mr. Stewart distinguished that situation from the current case because Sean had a history of 
Medicaid eligibility and contended, therefore, that it was unreasonable for PCMC not to make 
more affirmative efforts to learn of Sean's financial eligibility. 
Petitioner contended that the elements of estoppel set forth in Eldredge v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd.. 795 P2d 671 (Ct. App. 1990) were met and PCMC's actions were reasonably 
prudent and diligent in processing the prior authorization request. 
In the Eldredge case, Mr. Eldredge, a county employee, received conflicting information on 
whether he could retire after a certain number of years without having to purchase previous 
years from when he had worked for the county at an earlier time. The Utah Coun of appeals 
sets forth the elements of the doctrine of estoppel as follows: 
As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is not assertable against the 
state and its agencies [citations omitted]. Utah courts have, however, carved out an 
exception to this general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain 
that the interests of justice so require [citations omitted]. In cases where such an issue 
arises, the critical inquire is whether it appears that the facts may be found with such 
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception [citations omitted]. 
The Court of Appeals then set forth in Eldredge the elements: 
The elements essential to invoke inequitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis 
of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to 
the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act [citations omitted]. 
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Based upon the evidence in the hearing record as a whole, the facts of this case do not meet all 
of the elements of government estoppel or the "unusual circumstances" referred to in Utah 
Administrative Rule R410-10A-4(5). Based upon the fact that PCMC had prior knowledge of 
the patient's Medicaid and did not follow up on the status of a case with this much of a 
financial impact, it is difficult to determine that PCMC's actions were entirely reasonable or 
that the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
Wherefore, based upon the evidence in the formal hearing record as a whole, the presiding 
officer concludes that DHCF's decision to deny authorization for lack of prior authorization 
for Sean's bone marrow transplant be AFFIRMED. 
.?/ DATED this c * / day of September 1998 
Margz 
Administrative Law Judge 
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No: 98-033-47 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / 7 day of October 1998, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINAL AGENCY ORDER AND RECOMMENDED DECSION, to the following parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID 
DAVID ERICKSON 
IHC LEGAL DEPARTMENT 
36 S STATE, 22ND FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
DR. PATRICK BEATTY, DIRECTOR 
BONE MARROW TRANSPLANT PROGRAM 
50 NORTH MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84132 
MR. AND MRS. DAUGAARD 
4625 N WOODEN SHOE RD 
KAMAS, UTAH 84061 
DR. LYNN LYON, PROFESSOR 
DEPT OF FAMILY Sc PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CENTER 
50 N MEDICAL DR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84132 
DR. ROBERTA ADAMS 
PCMC 
100 NORTH MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84113 
BERNADETTE MCNALLY 
BMT PROGRAM MANAGER 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER 
100 NORTH MEDICAL DR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84113 
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ROBERT STEWART, LEGAL COUNSEL 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
STEVE GATZEMEIER 
HEALTH PROGRAM MANAGER 
COVERAGE & REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
NANETTE STONE 
COVERAGE &. REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
MICHAEL DEILY, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DR. JOHN HYLEN 
COVERAGE & REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
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State of Utah 
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C«»\ t»nor 
Rod L. Beta 
Execuu^e (Director 
Michael •/. Deily 
Di\ tMun Director 
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July 23, 1998 
Ted W. Keyes, M.D. 
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
50 North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132 
Re: Sean Daugaard 
Medicaid # 0302605602 
UMU-1080-98-U 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
SUBJECT: AMENDED NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF 
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA 
Dear Dr. Keyes: 
This letter is to advise you Medicaid denies your request for funding for bone marrow 
transplantation for the above-mentioned client. The following critena have not been 
met: 
The following rules and criteria are applicable* 
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization 
1) Prior Authorization Request 
R414-10A-6(1): Pncr authorization is required for all transplantation services 
except for cornea and kidney transplantation. 
awwf % 
Ted W. Keyes, M.D. 
July 23, 1998 
Page 2 
Prior authorization was not requested before the transplantation was 
performed. 
Sincerely, 
Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S. 
Health Program Manager 
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy 
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing focm 
cc: Parents of Sean Daugaard 
4625 North Woodenshoe Road 




Page: 1 Document Name: . .147 
NOHI NOTICE HISTORY 12AUG98 09:59 
NOTICE NUMBER: MMAA ANA G 
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D CASE NUMBER: 00280190 
PROGRAM: DM BENEFIT MONTH: MAR97 DATE PRINTED: 0 9JUN97 
FROM: LUCERO, DEBBIE E 
YOUR APPLICATION FOR MEDICAID ASSISTANCE, DATED APRIL 11, 1997, 
WAS APPROVED ON 09 JUN 1996. 
YOUR MEDICAL COVERAGE BEGAN ON MARCH 01, 1997. YOU WILL RECEIVE A 
MEDICAL CARD IN THE MAIL. IT WILL LIST THE NAMES AND I.D. NUMBER OF 
ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WHO RECEIVE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. YOU MUST SHOW 
THIS CARD TO THE DOCTOR, PHARMACY, OR HOSPITAL TO GET MEDICAL 
COVERAGE. 
YOUNG CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL 
FOOD FROM THE WIC PROGRAM. FOR INFORMATION CALL 1-800-662-3638 OR 
CONTACT YOUR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT 
SCREEN 1 OF 2 
.Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:03:08 AM 
'=>:4":fi:(v i 
k l W ^ fo 
Page: 1 Document Name: S -.147 
* INFO * TO DISPLAY MORE RECORDS PRESS ENTER 
CAAL CASE ACTION LOG 12AUG98 10:06 
WORKER: ANA G 
CASE NUMBER: 00280190 CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D 
ACTION DATE WORKER NAME DEPT/REG/OFF 
3 0OCT97 ANITA L HALL HCS 
RECEIVED BANK VERIFICATION AND POSTED ASSET AND INCOME INFORMATION 
FOR OCTOBER REVIEW. FOUND ELIGIBLE. AUTH DM FOR NOV AND DEC. 
140CT97 ANITA L HALL HCS 
REVIEW RECEIVED FOR THE CLIENT. IT IS NOT SIGNED, NOR IS THERE VERIF. 
OF ASSET VALUE FOR BANK ACCOUNT. THIS DATE I SENT ALIR TO CLIENT 
09JUL97 DEBBIE E LUCERO HOP 
CLIENT CAME IN NO CARD FOR JULY 97. AUTH JULY 97 CARD CLIENT REPORTED 
SPOUSE NOT WORKING DID NOT REMOVE INCOME DOES NOT EFFECTIVE ELIG. 
09JUN97 DEBBIE E LUCERO HOP 
I HAVE RECD ALL NEEDED TO DO THIS DM. I HAD A HARD TIME GETTING THE INCOM 
FROM THE EMPLOYER HE IS A CONSTRUCTION WORKER AND DOES HIS OWN BOOKS. 
11APR97 DEBBIE E LUCERO HOP 
I HAVE RECD AP HERE AT PCMC GAVE 124 
SEARCH DATE NEXT 
Date: 3/12/98 Time: 10:10:21 AM 
Page : 1 Document: Name :WJ-tal47 
ORIGINAL CLAIM HISTORY INQUIRY - INPATIENT UB-82 1/2 6 
TCN: 97275211000021300 CAT-SVC: 01 ,CYCLE: CLERK: 000 LOC: CCF 
AID TYPE: A5 FUND: A CLM-STAT: N DENIED MED-REC-NUM: 384679295 
RECIPIENT-ID*: 0302605602 D/E-NAME: DAUGA SEAN NAME: MCCAULEY SEAN 
NB: BTH-DT: 05/26/92 SEX: M AGE: 005 PROV-TYP: ,01 PROV-NUM: 942854058 
OTHER-INS: N ESPDT: FAMILY-PLAN: AUTO-ACCID: N OTHER-ACCID: N EMPLOYMENT 
PRIOR-AUTH: P/A IND: REF-LIC#: ATT-PHYS: 87176 
ADMIT-LIC#: ADMIT-DATE: 07/08/97 ADMIT-HOUR: 08 ADMIT-TYPE: 1 
BEGINNING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 07/08/97 ENDING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 09/19/97 
ICD-9-CM 1: 20500 2: 99685 3: 00845 4: 2761 5: 2848 ACCIDENT-DATE: 
SURG-LIC-NUM: 10797 SURG-PROC-1: 4103 SURG-PROC-2: 0331 SURG-PROC-3: 413 
SURG -DAfST^TTr^T/l 7/97 SURG-DATE-2: 07/08/97 SURG-DATE-3: 07/08 
INELIG-DAYS: 000 OUTLIER-DAYS-APPROVED: 000 
NON-COV-DAYS: 000 COV-DAYS: 073 DATE-DISC: 09/19/97 DATE-DEATH: 
STILL-A-PATIENT: DISCHARGE-STATUS: C CHILD-ABUSE: SIGNATURE-IND : Y 
BILLING-DATE: 10/02/97 BILLING-TYPE: 111 ATTACH-IND: N INS-CO: 
ADJ-RSN: TCN-TO-CREDIT: 0 0000-000-000000 0 
DATE-PAID: 10/03/97 WARRANT-NUM: 00000669344 REIMB-AMT: .00 
STRL-CONSENT-DATE: INTERPRET-DATE: CIRC-IND: 
PAY-TO-PROV: 94 2854 058211 CCF-SENT-DATE: CO-PAYMENT-AMT: 
DRG-CODE: 481 
00 345 5 000 00 342 4 000 00 704 5 000 00 495 3 000 00 596 2 000 
4/0 3 -- bene. n^r rcL. jVTP 
D a t e : 3 / 3 0 / 9 8 T ime : 0 2 : 5 1 : 3 3 PM 
• ATTACHMENT INDICATOR 
REQUEST FOR PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 
Prior 
Oocu 
 Authorisation If \ C Q 4 4 O C\ 
ment Number j U J O J L L U 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
MEDICAL SERVICES FORM 
I Patent Name l*sl First V, I 
Omr^Prd/) /ftyfl^ 2 Age | 3 Sejt 5 " t AY 4 Client I 0 Number 
5 Pauent Street Address City State Zip Co<i« 
J " * " STATE USE ONLY 
| 5. Effective Dale 
7. Termination Date 
3 Proposed Medical Suppiies Orug, Therapy or Surgical Procedures 
(Idenufy Pnmary Procedure First) 
9. PROCEDURES DC 
OR SURGICAL COOE •3 Units 
11 Estimated 
Cost 




1 U/V^t<LA-TPD ft^lUF J-/A^gQi, 
- ^ A / O S P L A - I T m 
3 A-A! H A ^ S o r » rV^T^O A >FF1>; 
---c 
13 Will the services of an A Anesthesiologist be used'7 LJ Yes 
B Assistant at Surgery be -ised'' CI Yes 
14 Cm this orocedure be done in your office ^ ] Yes EST No (" n o comolete items 15 »hrougn 18 be«cw ) 
16- STATE USE ONLY 15 Hospital or Surgical Center Name and Address 
P&lMft£y C W L £ > £ _ c 7 ) 0 5 > H£FD GtrXfiE}^ Facility P r o b e r Number 
/CO /L,0£Trh tfElDlCAL Q<. 




18 ICO 9 CM CODE 
70 
19 STATE USE ONLY 
L—«9CTQ>< SUn/ Approvedl 
20 SUMMARY OF HISTORY (Physical Examination Laboratory, X-ray sftfTSIes prescriptions and other applicable documentation must be supplied in sufficient 
detail to justify the necessity for the procedure if the pauent is mentally retarded or under psychiatric treatment, p*e*se so indicate and attach additional documenta-
tion as appropriate ) 
s a ^ ATT-flCtvso 
21 Noo-Therapeutic Stenlcartlon Request, complete A through C beiow Also asach the completed copy No 1 si form 499-A (Part If), before mailing to this office 
* A_ bs the above pettont in fi institution or a correctional facility? D Yes D N o 
B. b m « above patient mentally IU7 • l 
* C, fc» the above patient mentariry^retarded?^ „ D Ye* • No 
Patient's Date 
" o* Birttc \ , 
MM DO YY 
22 Name and Address of Requesting or Supprytng Provider 
i3c>rO<^ /-tttr^uj T^/kjr^Pct^uir P/2OC?GA^ 
PZHC QATE OF REQUEST f /9 <?"7 
sea urr SV//3 
^ c T 
23 Signature 
24 Requesting 
Provider Numoer (12 OIGJTS) 
25 Name and Address c: -*ferrtng or Prescnbing Provider 
j i^P/e. "7S0 ££Y£S^ 
/2. 
25 Referring or Prescribing 
Provider License Number 
^ C ^ . A ^ ^ F O R STATE USE ONLY . - ^ J NOTE, This is NOT a certrficate of eligibility nor a guarantee of payment amount 
requested Eligibility must be confirmed by reviewing an eligibility card current 'or 
the month services *rm to be performed 
SOH OHCF PA-3 (9-A8) 
U>J£< Vf<s^--r r g g ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ ^ c ^ ^ » 
.--m-m o 0'~ 
= - P * t -sMa 
' ^ ^ ^ f ^ S ^ y c j r i f c ^ R e v i e j e ^ j Authority ^^PP'f^.P?'*^ 
&HhV 4 
CASE S U M M A R Y 
rz PERS O IS/AGENCY SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION/ACTIOPf 
r\ 3S-^ - ! /llPrvSC
 t J u ^ M • *.o .'*» I t l cc j : L I W „£_ deer. flirt iA„ v-Aj^c o?.^ J-
"O 4> 
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